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INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)' differs
fundamentally from Title VII 2 Both prohibit something called
"discrimination," but discrimination under the ADA means
something quite distinct from what it means under Title VII. Under
Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes,3 employers can
safely make employment decisions if they ignore race and other
protected statuses and focus solely on criteria related to
productivity. If they ignore race and other protected statuses,
employers cannot engage in disparate treatment discrimination.
That type of discrimination only occurs if race or another protected
status becomes a motivating factor in an employment decision.4 If
employers focus solely on productivity-related criteria in making a
decision, they cannot engage in disparate impact discrimination.
That type of discrimination only occurs if a disparate impact
against a protected group is not justified by concerns related to
productivity.
5
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-56 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
3. The models of discrimination under Title VII have become the standard throughout
American discrimination law. See, e.g., RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE
STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 7.02 n.1 (1998) (discussing application of the Title VII
models in age discrimination cases); ROBERTG. SCHWEMM,HOUSING DISCRIMINATION §§ 10.1-
10.4 (1992) (discussing application of the Title VII models in housing discrimination cases).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (defining an "unlawful employment practice" as when "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice").
If an employer would have acted in the same manner "in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor," the individual bringing the complaint is only entitled to limited relief. Id.
§ 200Oe-5(gX2)(B); see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (holding
that "once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part in an
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it
would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role");
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,804 (1973) (barring pretextual employment
actions under Title VII).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)
(finding that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability").
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At issue here are the basic models of discrimination. The central
thrust of Title VII employs a "sameness" model of discrimination,
requiring employers to treat African Americans and women exactly
the same as others;" their race and sex must be ignored and
employers must focus instead on factors related to productivity.
Although the ADA uses a sameness model in part, its distinctive
thrust is a "difference" model, requiring employers to treat indi-
viduals with disabilities differently and more favorably than
others.' Employers must treat individuals with disabilities as
qualified if they "can perform the essential functions" of the job.'
Employers are free to treat others as qualified only if they can
perform all of the functions of the job. Similarly, employers must
make "reasonable accommodations" for individuals with dis-
abilities.9 Sometimes these accommodations may be expensive or
require significant alterations in the way a job is structured. Yet
neither Title VII nor the ADA require employers to make these
accommodations for others.'1
Our position sharply contrasts that of Professor Jolls, who
recently has argued that reasonable accommodation is funda-
mentally similar to the discrimination models developed under
Title VII, especially the disparate impact model." Part of our
6. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. For convenience, we generally refer only to race or sex
discrimination in our examples.
7. See Green v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 897-98 (7th Cir. 1999) (declaring that
an accommodation claim is so distinct from a disparate treatment claim that it must be
charged separately before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to preserve the
claim); Aka v. Wash. Hoop. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1303-05 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
claim that the ADA merely requires individuals with disabilities to be treated the same as
similar employees); see also Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,
Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1, 10-11 (1996) (explaining
the sameness and difference models of discrimination under the ADA).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
9. Id. § 12112(bXSXA).
10. See Martinez v. NBC, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308-09, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that
lactation does not fall within the meaning of "disability" under the ADA and that no
obligation exists ... under Title VII to provide facilities to allow a woman to breast feed her
baby); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867,870 (W.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 351
(6th Cir. 1991) ("Nothing in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act or Title VII, obliges employers
to accommodate -the child-care concerns of breast-feeding female workers by providing
additional leave not available to male workers.").
11. ChristineJolls,AntidiscriminationandAccommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,652-
1200 [Vol. 44:1197
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disagreement turns on how we define important terms like
"accommodation," "discrimination," and "disparate impact, " 12 but
the deeper differences implicate basic conceptions of discrimination
and accommodation. Exploring these differences sheds light on the
developing understanding of Title VII and the ADA, with important
practical consequences. In our view, Professor Jolls aligns the ADA
with non-core cases of discrimination under Title VII, which
threatens to impair both the growth and the strength of the
accommodation model. In contrast, our conception of
accommodation, which is not derivative of Title VII, stakes out a
strong and independent position for this type of discrimination.
The meaning of reasonable accommodation is the ADA's "great
unsettled question," 3 and, along with the definitional question of
who counts as disabled (a question we do not address here), one of
its two most important ones. The duty of reasonable
accommodation is the core of the ADA; it defines the scope of the
Act's protections for individuals with disabilities. Determining its
meaning is crucially important for courts, which are confused and
inconsistent; for individuals with disabilities, who have uncertain
protections; for employers, who have unpredictable obligations; and,
most importantly, for society as a whole, which seeks to affirm the
worth and dignity of individuals with disabilities within the
constraints imposed by a well-functioning labor market."
66 (2001).
12. For Professor Jolls' definitions of these terms, see id. at 646-51.
13. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 8. It is not surprising that the question is
unsettled. At a comparable stage of development, the meaning of discrimination under Title
VII was equally unsettled. The employment provisions of the ADA have been in effect since
1992. Ten years after the effective date of Title VII (July 1, 1965), Griggs and McDonnell
Douglas had been decided only recently and were still unfamiliar. By 1975, none of the major
cases on the other major models of discrimination-systemic disparate treatment and mixed-
motives discrimination-had been decided. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (mixed-motive discrimination); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977) (systemic disparate treatment); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977) (same). The Court's first pronouncements on major issues such as affirmative action
and sexual harassment were still years away. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986) (hostile work environment claims); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979) (affirmative action by private employers).
14. The dignity and respect of individuals with disabilities was an important part of the
congressional debate on the ADA. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,370 (1990) (statement of Sen.
Harkin) (claiming that the essence of the ADA is to treat people "fairly and decently, as
coequal in all aspects of American life"); id. at 17,033 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (remarking
2003] 1201
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Understanding reasonable accommodation is also important
because the concept is likely to extend beyond the ADA into other
areas of discrimination law. Our central claim in this Article is that
the ADA expands on prior conceptions of discrimination. Under
Title VII, as currently understood, the employer defines the job as
it wishes; the law merely insists that workers and applicants for
those jobs be treated without regard to race or sex. The ADA goes
beyond and asks employers to restructure the jobs themselves. We
suggest that, over time, this sort of inquiry will spill over into Title
VII cases as well and, from there, into general conceptions of
discrimination across the entire range of discrimination law. 5
This Article presents a framework for thinking about the duty of
reasonable accommodation. 6 The framework is primarily economic,
in that we try to identify the incentives and tradeoffs created by the
statute. We recognize that Congress rejected efficiency as the
guiding principle for the ADA and that the Act sometimes requires
that the ADA will provide individuals with disabilities with "the fundamental rights to equal
opportunity which everyone deserves"); id. at 17,031 (statement of Sen. Durenberger)
(stating that the ADA recognizes that "people with disabilities [should) be treated with the
dignity and respect they deserve"); 135 CoNG. REC. 19,801 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
(commenting that the ADA is a "20th century emancipation proclamation for people with
disabilities").
15. This type of spillover is common and perhaps inevitable. The conceptions of
discrimination developed under Title VII have spilled over into the rest of American
discrimination law, see supra note 3, and indeed, into discrimination law around the world.
See Shields v. E. Coomes, Ltd., [1978] W.L.R. 1408, 1416 (Eng.) (Lord Denning, C.A.) (noting
that "the English [employment discrimination] legislation is based a good deal upon United
States experience"); see also Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact
Discrimination:American Oddity or InternationallyAccepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEYJ. EMP.
& LAB. L. 108, 112-24 (1998) (discussing the concept of disparate-impact discrimination
internationally). Similarly, Professor Issacharoff has argued that job protections first
recognized in the public sector have spilled over into the private sector. Samuel Issacharoff,
Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARV. L. REV. 607, 616-17 (1990) (reviewing PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABORAND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)).
The initial trickling of spillover from the ADA to Title VII can already be seen in the
literature. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for
Pregnancy, Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that Title VII
should be interpreted to require employers to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy and breastfeeding).
16. This Article focuses on the meaning of reasonable accommodation, the core obligation
of the ADA, and not on the broader model of disability discrimination within which the
accommodation obligation sits. Because of this focus, the Article will not examine other
important issues under the ADA, such as who qualifies as an individual with a disability
under the Act or what remedies are appropriate for ADA violations.
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inefficient actions.' 7 Nevertheless, Congress did not and could not
declare that the Act would not affect incentives, nor did it declare
that the Act should not get the most "bang for its buck." Our
approach and its emphasis on incentives can help identify the
nature of the still uncertain preferences embedded in the ADA and,
once they are identified, help specify their reach and limits more
precisely.18
Part I begins by sketching an informal economic model of how
employers choose among workers of varying productivity and costs.
We use this model to distinguish two ways in which the ADA
interferes with an employer's choice of workers, what we call "soft
preferences" and "hard preferences."
Part II explores the justifications for soft preferences. Here, the
ADA tracks other antidiscrimination statutes, and so the justifi-
cations are similar. As in Title VII's disparate treatment model,
the ADA requires employers to favor money profits over any desire
to indulge their prejudices against the disabled. Similarly, the
ADA follows Title VII in prohibiting facially neutral practices that
adversely affect the disabled, unless the employer can show the
practice to be job related. The ADA, like Title VII, also prohibits
statistical discrimination by employers who act on myths or even
true stereotypes about the costs or productivity of the disabled.
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(bX5XA) (2000); see also Gregory S. Crespi,
Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1 (1990) (arguing that the ADA should be interpreted without
regard to economic efficiency).
18. In addition, although we do not engage in the task here, thinking about the
economics of the ADA can help frame hypotheses and empirically test the consequences of
the Act. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POLIT. ECON. 915 (2001) (finding that
the ADA produced substantial disemployment effects for most men and young women with
disabilities); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 691 (2000) (finding that the ADA decreased relative
employment and increased relative wages of individuals with disabilities). For a critique of
these studies, see Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics ofthe Americans
with Disabilities Act: Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 271 (2000). For other studies using economics to explore the ADA, see Scott A. Moss
& Daniel A. Malin, Note,Public Fundingfor DisabilityAccommodations:A Rational Solution
to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197
(1998); Christopher J. Willis, Comment, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Disabling the Disabled, 25 CuMB. L. REV. 715 (1995).
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The ADA extends beyond the Title VII models, however, by
mandating hard preferences as well as soft preferences. The
remainder of the Article shows how and why. Part III describes the
hard preferences of the ADA and shows why they comprise a
distinctive model of discrimination, known as reasonable accom-
modation. In some circumstances, the ADA requires employers to
accommodate individuals with disabilities even though they cost
more to employ than others or are able to produce less. In other
words, the ADA requires a type of affirmative action to achieve its
goal of integrating individuals with disabilities into the labor
market as full and productive members.
Part IV examines the scope of the reasonable accommodation
requirement. It first looks for statutory clues of meaning. It then
examines the procedural and substantive accommodation com-
ponents. Finally, it offers various ways to define the reach and
limits of the accommodation requirement.
The conclusion sums up our findings and explores the factors
which make us think that reasonable accommodation, in the long
run, will not be confined to the ADA. Instead, we expect the
expanded notion of discrimination to become part of Title VII cases
as well, and of cases in virtually every other area of discrimination
law.
I. MODELING SOFT AND HARD PREFERENCES
A. The Employer's Choice Between Workers
Suppose an employer wants to increase its workforce and is
deciding among an array of applicants. These applicants differ in
many ways, but the employer is primarily interested in two
dimensions--compensation and productivity. For example, the
employer may be deciding between more productive college
graduates and less productive high school graduates. Other
employers are also bidding for workers, and the outside wage for
college graduates is higher than for high school graduates. In
general terms, the employer must decide whether the greater
productivity of the college graduates justifies their higher salary,
which will depend on whether this employer, relative to other
1204 [Vol. 44:1197
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employers, can make better use of college graduates than high
school graduates.
An employer trying to maximize profits will employ the workers
who maximize output per dollar of compensation.19 Assume, for
example, that the going rate for high school graduates is $10/hour
and at this firm a high school graduate (HS') could produce twelve
widgets each hour, which sell for $1 each. The going rate for college
graduates is $15/hour and at this firm a college graduate (C) could
produce fifteen widgets each hour. Since the productivity per dollar
cost is 1.2 for this high school graduate (12 widgets/$10 wage) and
only 1 for college graduates (15/$15), the employer prefers hiring
the high school graduate. The extra productivity of college
graduates in widget making at this firm is not worth the higher
wage they command. On the other hand, if high school graduates
could only produce eight widgets at this firm (HS2), their
productivity/cost ratio would only be 0.8 (8 widgets/$10 wage). In
that case, the employer would prefer college graduates.
The general principle of this example is that employers will seek
the highest ratio of output to costs in making hiring decisions.20
Employers are not interested in costs or productivity standing
alone, but in their relation. Figure 1 depicts the situation.
Compared to college graduates at this firm, employers will prefer
anyone on a higher productivity/cost line (such as HS I) and reject
anyone below the line (such as HS2). None of this is surprising. It
19. EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 11-19 (1998). See
generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975) (discussing the differences in
average earnings between college and high school graduates in the United States); JACOB
MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS (1974) (same). For an application of the
concept, see William McNaught & Michael C. Barth, Are Older Workers "Good Buys"? -A
Case Study of Days Inns of America, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 1992, at 53.
20. See LAZEAR, supra note 19, at 16-17. In our model, the employer can be thought of
as determining the best type of additional workers to hire to increase sales by a given
amount. The model does not examine how many workers the employer should hire overall.
When the labor market is in equilibrium, the cost (including wages and all other costs) ofthe
last worker hired of each type is just worth his or her marginal product. In other words, the
productivity/cost (P/C) ratio is equal to 1-which is how we have modeled the college workers
in our example. If high school workers at a particular firm have P/C ratios greater than 1,
the firm would hire an indefinitely large number of high school workers. At some point,
presumably, the high school workers start getting in each other's way and productivity
relative to cost falls below 1, restoring equilibrium by eliminating the comparative advantage
of high school workers.
2003] 1205
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is merely a verbal and graphic refinement of the basic intuition that
employers prefer employees who cost less and produce more. This
simple model, however, illustrates how workers should be allocated
among firms. Even if college graduates are more productive than
high school graduates at every workplace, it does not follow that
every workplace should choose college graduates over high school
graduates. College graduates command higher wages, reflecting
their higher general value. Employers who are relatively good at
making high school graduates productive should employ high
school graduates. After discussing some complications in the
model, we apply it in the next section to help define reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.
Figure 1: Productivity/Cost Ratio As











The information required to determine the tradeoff between
productivity and cost is easy to model, but difficult for employers to
acquire in practice. On the cost axis, the employer's goal is to
account for all of the costs of labor. Thus, the employer would
attempt to estimate both costs that vary with hours worked, such
as wages and overtime pay (variable costs), and costs that vary
with the number of workers hired, such as hiring and training
costs (quasi-fixed costs).' Some of the costs, such as workers'
compensation and health care costs, will vary depending on un-
known contingencies.22
The productivity axis is even more difficult for the employer to
estimate. Employees who learn quickly and are willing to work
hard are likely to be more productive, but these types of
characteristics are difficult for the employer to predict. To estimate
them better, employers may require applicants to possess certain
easy-to-observe qualifications, such as a college degree or relevant
work experience. Similarly, employers may engage in extensive
interviews or other screening practices. 2 Many of these practices
are expensive, however, so employers will have to decide whether
the improved ability to predict productivity is worth the cost of the
screening practices. Sometimes they may be, at other times they
may not. And even with these practices, employers find it difficult
to predict productivity accurately. Productivity depends not only on
the worker's personal characteristics, but also on relational factors
such as the number of other workers employed by the employer and
the employer's level of capital.24 Individual productivity is especially
difficult to estimate when output is a joint product of several
workers.25
21. See ROBERTJ. FLANAGAN ETAL., ECONOMICS OFTHE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 94-
96(1989).
22. See id. at 93-96.
23. For a general discussion of the use of credentials and screening devices, see id. at
113-17.
24. See id. at 56.
25. AMARTYASEN, INEQUALITYREEXAMINED 119 (1992); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching
Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE
L.J. 595, 606 (1993). For a lengthy and insightful discussion of the difficulties of predicting
productivity through employment testing, see Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in
'General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991).
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The hiring calculus of employers is also difficult to determine
because both costs and productivity must be estimated over time.
The employer is not attempting to estimate costs and productivity
at the point of hiring alone, but rather is comparing the stream of
costs and the stream of productivity over the expected work life of
the applicant. Some costs will be heavily weighted to the beginning
of employment, such as moving costs and the costs of on-the-job
training. Others, such as severance pay, will be weighted near
the end of employment. Similarly, many workers will not be
fully productive when they begin their employment. For example,
some workers may require orientation or on-the-job training.
Additionally, workers are unlikely to be consistently productive
over their entire work lives.2" The precise time period over which
the estimate must be made is also uncertain. Some employees may
have long work lives with the employer, others short. Employers
estimating costs and productivity must take account of these time-
based differences. Instead of comparing only current wages and
current productivity, for example, employers must compare the
present value of the expected stream of wages over time to the
present value of the expected stream of productivity over time. This
complication leads to more uncertainty.
In sum, although employers operate with a great deal of
uncertainty, they attempt to maximize the ratio of productivity to
labor costs when they make hiring decisions. Individuals with
disabilities, like everyone else, operate within this framework when
they seek a job-their costs and productivity are being compared to
those of others.
B. The ADA's Labor Market Preferences
The ADA creates labor market preferences for individuals with
disabilities. It would be very surprising if it did not. The Act was
26. Life cycle models of employment generally assume a productivity curve that is low
early in a worker's career when the worker must be monitored closely while learning
important job skills, then rises gradually as the worker acquires those skills and requires
less monitoring, and then declines late in the worker's career because of age and the gradual
obsolescence of the worker's skills. See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH,
MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 302-06 (6th ed. 1997).
1208 [Vol. 44:1197
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conceived and enacted to reverse the status quo and "bring persons
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life."27 Thus, unless the ADA required individuals with
disabilities to be treated more favorably than they had been
previously, the central purpose of the Act could not be achieved. The
ADA's clear purpose was to require employers to treat individuals
with disabilities more favorably than they had been treated prior to
the Act.
Preferences can take two distinct forms. "Soft preferences," as we
will label them, seek to remove disadvantages. "Hard preferences"
try to put disabled workers in a more advantageous position.
1. Soft Preferences
Before the ADA, some employers treated individuals with
disabilities less favorably than other workers of equal productivity
and cost. The Act creates a soft preference for individuals with
disabilities by removing that disadvantage. This type of preference
is only a preference compared to the prior status quo. Because
individuals with disabilities were treated less favorably than others
before the ADA, treating them the same as others now is a
preference. This new treatment is a soft preference, though,
because individuals with disabilities are not treated more favorably
than others; instead, they are merely treated the same.
Figure 2 illustrates this type of preference. Prior to the ADA, for
reasons that will be discussed below, an employer may have
preferred the comparator (C) to both an individual with a disability
who was willing to work for the same wage as C, but was more
productive (I') and an individual with a disability who was as
productive as C, but was willing to work for a lower wage (12).28 This
type of employer was discriminating in the classic economic
sense-the employer was treating individuals with disabilities
less favorably based on personal characteristics unrelated to
productivity.29 The ADA created a soft preference for individuals
27. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
28. See infra Part II.
29. This widely used conception of discrimination follows Gary Becker's classic taste-for-
discrimination model. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-42 (2d ed.
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with disabilities by making this type of disadvantage in the labor
market illegal. This is a real and significant preference, but it is
important to note again that it is only a preference compared to the
prior status quo. The soft preference of the ADA only requires
employers to treat individuals with disabilities the same as others,
that is, without discrimination based on personal characteristics
unrelated to productivity.
1971). See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS § 5530, at 575-79 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (describing Gary Becker's taste-for-discrimination
model and its relation to competitive markets).
1210 [Vol. 44:1197
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Preferences, however, can take another form, which we call hard
preferences. Hard preferences require employers to engage in
"affirmative action" by treating individuals with disabilities more
favorably than other workers with better cost and productivity
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characteristics. These hard preferences are central to several key
obligations of the ADA, such as the duty of reasonable accom-
modation, the undue hardship limitation, and the obligation to
consider only the ability to perform essential job functions. This
discussion focuses on the duty of reasonable accommodation. 30
In terms of Figure 2, the ADA would mandate a hard preference
if it forced an employer to choose a disabled worker below the
comparator line. As we shall see, the ADA in general gives a hard
preference to disabled workers like D', who are equally productive
but more costly than the comparator. Only in certain situations,
however, will the ADA mandate a hard preference for disabled
workers like D2, who are less productive but no more costly than the
comparator.
II. JUSTIFYING SOFT PREFERENCES
The ADA was not written on a social tabula rasa. It was a
response to labor market conditions that produced very bad
outcomes for individuals with disabilities, such as non-employment
rates of sixty-six percent and median household incomes near the
poverty line. 1 Thejustifications for the labor market preferences of
the ADA have to be read against the backdrop of those conditions.
One has to first explore the primary causes of the problems faced by
individuals with disabilities in the labor market. Only then can one
evaluate the justifications for the labor market preferences of the
ADA.
This Part examines why individuals with disabilities may face
adverse labor market outcomes for reasons unrelated to their
individual productivity. The ADA attempts to rectify these
disadvantages with soft preferences. In large part, the justifications
for soft preferences track the standard justifications for Title VII's
preferences. Part III examines how the labor market also penalizes
30. The ADA also contains a number of other important obligations, such as restrictions
on segregation, employment tests, and medical examinations and inquiries. 42 U.S.C. §§
12112(b) (1), 12112(b) (7), 12112(d) (2000). Discussion of these other obligations is outside the
scope of this Article.
31. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,314.
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workers whose disabilities lower their individual productivity. The
ADA attempts to rectify these disadvantages with hard preferences.
Bifurcating the analysis into causes of disadvantage and
justifications for preferences is problematic for several reasons.
First, the causes of the labor market problems faced by individuals
with disabilities are many and diverse. For tractability we analyze
the causes one at a time, even though the causes have complex and
often reinforcing relationships with each other. Employer aversion,
for example, may mean that individuals with disabilities have less
work experience than others, producing lower average productivity
and resulting in statistical discrimination. 2 This phenomenon
discourages individuals with disabilities from investing in their
human capital, thus justifying and intensifying continued employer
aversion.3 Second, the population of individuals with disabilities is
diverse. It consists of persons with a wide variety of distinct health
conditions and functional limitations, in contrast to African
Americans and women, who are members of protected classes
because they possess a single characteristic common to the entire
group.34 The problems facing different segments of the population
protected by the ADA differ significantly, and we will not often
refine our analysis to account for these types of differences.3" Third,
although many of the points made could be supported (or
undermined) by empirical research, this discussion will be
primarily a theoretical examination of possible justifications for the
ADA. Even with these shortcomings, the analysis is valuable. The
32. A number of articles discuss how statistical discrimination can interact with other
factors to produce a self-fulfilling prophesy of lower labor market outcomes for women. See
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women:
A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585,
633-35; McCaffery, supra note 25, at 615-24; see also Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort,
and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. S33, S42 (1985) (arguing that gender
discrimination, even if small in magnitude, may produce large wage disparities between men
and women).
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 761 (1991).
34. See Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (1997).
35. A number of studies have shown that the intensity of prejudice varies by type of
impairment. See John L. Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4
J. SPECIAL EDUC. 295, 303-05 (1970); Harold E. Yuker, The Disability Hierarchies:
Comparative Reactions to Various Types of Physical and Mental Disabilities (1987)
(unpublished working paper, Hofstra University) (on file with authors).
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goal here is not to prove that the ADA is justified or unjustified on
economic grounds. The goal is to provide a labor market framework
for thinking about the proper legal meaning of reasonable accom-
modation.
A. Employer Aversion
Some employers dislike dealing with disabled workers. Doing so
makes them uncomfortable. This employer aversion is the disability
equivalent of misogyny or racism. This type of discrimination is not
based on concerns about monetary costs or productivity. The
employer does not think that a particular individual with dis-
abilities costs more to employ or is less productive, nor does the
employer think (either rightly or erroneously) that individuals with
disabilities as a group are less able as employees. The employer
simply prefers not to employ them.
Employer aversion against individuals with disabilities is
common and well documented, 6 although it varies dramatically by
disability. Epilepsy, for example, generally entails little or no
functional limitations (because it is largely controllable by medi-
cation) and yet is viewed quite negatively.3" In contrast, arthritis
generally imposes nontrivial functional limitations and yet is
viewed positively, relative to other disabilities. Adverse employer
attitudes towards individuals with disabilities play an important
role in producing adverse labor market outcomes.38
36. For several examples, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 413, 418-19 (1991).
37. See Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care: Lessons from HIV Testing,
61 ALB. L. REV. 831,837 (1998) (noting that persons with epilepsy"have faced discrimination
based on the irrational fear that they might be contagious").
38. See Marjorie Baldwin & William Johnson, The Sources of Employment
Discrimination: Prejudice or Poor Information, in NEW APPROACHES TO EMPLOYEE
MANAGEMENT 163-80 (David M. Saunders ed., 1994) (concluding that a statistically
significant correlation exists between rankings ofimpairments based on employer prejudice
and rankings based on size of unexplained wage differential); Marjorie L. Baldwin & William
G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with Disabilities in the Year of the
ADA, S. ECON. J. 548,561-62 (2000) (finding that men subject to the most employer prejudice




Psychic costs are true costs, even for employers. If an employer
faces psychic costs from employing a disabled worker, it would
prefer to add those costs to the pecuniary costs. Because of the extra
psychic costs, an employer will choose the nondisabled over the
disabled worker if both have the same productivity and monetary
costs. The result is that disabled workers will have lower wages
than equally productive nondisabled workers, or must wo)rk in
segregated workforces, or both.3 9
The ADA, like Title VII, attempts to force employers to ignore
these psychic costs. An employer violates the ADA when it makes
a decision because of personal aversion. This is one form of the
ADA's soft preference for disabled workers. The ADA's soft
preference forces employers to consider only monetary costs and
true productivity of disabled workers, rather than the psychic costs
of aversion or reduced productivity due to aversion by employers
themselves, coworkers, or customers.
How can the ADA's anti-aversion soft preference be justified?
Many observers find this aspect of the ADA to be uncontroversial,
compared to the hard preference requirement of reasonable
accommodation. But Title VII's analogous anti-aversion soft
preferences have created a heated debate in recent years.4 0 It is
therefore worth applying the arguments and counterarguments to
the ADA, before moving on to more difficult issues of justifying
other aspects of the ADA.
The problem of justifying an anti-aversion law arises from
whether and how to credit the preferences of bigots. Bigots are
willing and able to accept reduced profits or wages (or higher prices
in the case of customers) for the freedom to discriminate, and this
39. This type of analysis derives from BECKER, supra note 29, at 153. See also William
M. Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL ECON. 507, 509-12 (1968)
(predicting that fair employment laws increase a minority's wages relative to those of the
majority by adding costs to employers for violations of these laws).
40. See, for example, the debate between Professors Donohue and Posner. John J.
Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) [hereinafter Donohue,
Efficient]; Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513 (1987); John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination
Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 534-40 (1987) [hereinafter
Donohue, Reply]; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 76-78, 147-49, 181 (1992) (advocating that Title VII be
abolished on grounds that it infringes on liberty and that its losses exceed its gains).
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willingness and ability may exceed the gains to those suffering from
discrimination. If so, a law banning bigotry is inefficient.4 '
Efficiency analysis is used to determine what laws will maximize
satisfaction of all the individual preferences in society. In the
context of the ADA's soft preference, the classic economic approach
is to ask what law will maximize both the interest of individuals
with disabilities to be treated in the workplace based on their
productivity and the interest of employers in satisfying their
aversion to those individuals. Viewed in this way, the ADA is likely
to be inefficient because it interferes with the unrestrained
bargaining that best maximizes both sets of preferences.42
Several responses to this inefficiency claim are possible. First,
one can argue on fairness grounds that psychic costs from employer
aversion to the disabled should not count in the social calculus
about the appropriateness of the ADA. The primary role of
employers should be to make money by making cost-effective hiring
decisions, not to indulge in discriminatory tastes. If employer
aversion is discounted, the ADA's soft preference has only winners
(the disabled persons who can now compete on neutral grounds of
productivity and monetary cost) and no 'legitimate" losers.
Employers' prior indulgence in their aversion to the disabled is
illegitimate, as are the gains of "neutral" nondisabled workers who
41. This is the Kaldor-Hicks formulation ofefficiency in which those who gain from a law
could compensate those who lose and still be better off. Unlike Pareto efficiency, the Kaldor-
Hicks concept of efficiency contemplates winners and losers. See Allan M. Feldman, Kaldor-
Hicks Compensation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 417
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). Kaldor-Hicks is the most common conception of efficiency used
in legal analysis. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (5th ed. 1998)
(noting that ninety percent of references to efficiency in policy analysis are to Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency). However, the appropriate definition of efficiency and the concept's usefulness in
legal analysis are controversial. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS,ANDTHE LAW 96-
97, 130-32 (1988); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991); Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53,
55-58 (1992). See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARv. L. REV. 961, 1377 (2001) ("Even though the Kaldor-Hicks test is not appropriate as a
matter of principle, the test can be quite useftil because ... it often is sensible for legal policy
analysis to focus on efficiency.").
42. For an argument along these lines that prohibiting discrimination is inefficient, see
Donohue, Efficient, supra note 40, at 1402-23; John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex
Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1344-47
(1989) [hereinafter Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination]. In both these articles,
Professor Donohue presents the inefficiency argument, but then proceeds to critique it.
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benefitted from the employers' prior indulgence. The law is
therefore efficient once the fairness discounting argument is
accepted.
Some prominent economists not usually known for advocacy of
government intervention in markets have accepted this discounting
argument." Nevertheless, many commentators are worried by the
circularity of the argument-relying on the law itself to argue that
some of the costs of the law should be ignored-and its potentially
broad scope, because all laws can be justified if their costs are
ignored on "fairness" grounds. As John Donohue has pointed out,
this circularity is like arguing that laws prohibiting abortion prior
to Roe v. Wade"' were efficient because the existence of the laws
reflects a societal consensus that costs to women wanting abortions
should be ignored. 5
A related argument for the ADA's anti-aversion preferences is
that the statutory goal is to change the preferences of employers.
Such a goal cannot be criticized on efficiency grounds. If the ADA's
primary effect is to reduce employer aversion to hiring individuals
with disabilities, the ADA may be efficient given the post-ADA set
of preferences, even though it would be inefficient if the pre-ADA
set of preferences continued to exist. The ability of law to function
as a preference-shaping mechanism, rather than simply as a
preference-accumulation mechanism, is becoming increasingly well
recognized. 6 There is considerable evidence that Title VII has
changed existing preferences about the proper role of women and
43. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 39, at 548 ("Psyche losses to whites should not be
deducted from benefits, because by passing a fair employment law society is saying, in effect,
that the psyche income from discrimination that accrues to whites should not enter society's
social welfare function."); see also George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78
J. POL. ECON. 526,527 (1970) (using Gary S. Becker's work on social gains to propose rational
methods of enforcing criminal laws).
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra note 42, at 1343-44.
46. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More Than Prices: The Economic
Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 162-63 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995);
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109-10, 125-33
(1983); Kenneth G. Dau.Schmidt,An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3, 26-32 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1146-50 (1986).
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African Americans in the workplace.47 The ADA operates in an area
where the preexisting bias was less central to ideological beliefs and
often less conscious. Thus, the ADA may operate to change
employer aversion even more quickly.
In addition to altering employer preferences, the ADA may also
alter the preferences of disabled individuals. If the ADA improves
working conditions and enhances the self-esteem of individuals
with disabilities as intended, they may become more productive and
more willing to enter the workforce. Thus, these effects of the ADA
may mean that it is efficient to hire individuals with disabilities
after the Act improves their productivity and willingness to enter
the workforce, even if it was inefficient to hire them before."8
Finally, the ADA's anti-aversion goal can be justified even if one
does not try to change preferences and weights them all equally.
First, one can argue that third parties suffer psychic harm by living
in a society that tolerates exclusionary bargains between bigoted
employers and nondisabled employees. The argument strikes at the
heart of the assumption that voluntary contracts promote overall
welfare, by showing that unregulated employment contracts affect
third parties.49 Second, one can argue that the market tends to
drive out bigots in the long run and the ADA merely (or efficiently)
helps in speeding that process. The general argument that markets
will even theoretically drive out all discrimination is problematic at
best,5' as is the specific argument that an antidiscrimination law
47. See, e.g., PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE U.S. SINCE THE NEW DEAL 141 (1985) (explaining
that the number of people who consider African Americans to be equal to whites has
increased since 1964); Andrea H. Beller, The Impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 on Women's Entry into Nontraditional Occupations: An Economic Analysis, 1 LAW &
INEQ. 73, 80-82 (1983) (finding that Title VII improved women's access to nontraditional
jobs); James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment
Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 276, 277-80 (1990)
(noting that Title VII played a significant role in improving wages and occupational status
of African Americans).
48. Cf Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra note 42, at 1348-55 (noting that
even slight shifts in demand curves can yield large benefits).
49. Cf Donohue, Reply, supra note 40, at 531 (arguing that Title VII would be efficient,
even under very conservative assumptions, if every American were willing to pay five dollars
once to live in a society that limited racial discrimination).
50. See Schwab, supra note 29, at 572-82.
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can efficiently speed the process.5 But those arguments need not
detain us here.
In sum, one cause of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities is employer aversion. Under classic economic analysis,
the ADA would be presumptively inefficient in frustrating the
ability of employers to act on this aversion, but three arguments
justify the ADA here. First, the psychic interest of employers in
discriminating should not be given any value in the. efficiency
analysis. Second, the goal of the ADA is to change employer
preferences, which by definition cannot be criticized on efficiency
grounds. Third, the ADA may enhance efficiency by responding to
psychic costs of third parties outside the employer-employee
relationship or by speeding the transition to a nondiscriminatory
state.52
B. Employer Ignorance About Productivity
Employers may also treat individuals with disabilities less
favorably than others because of ignorance about their true
productivity. Whereas the disability-averse employers discussed in
the previous section were invidious, the employers of this section
are ignorant. Their collective ignorance is not neutral, however.
Because of age-old myths or stereotypes, the employers discussed
in this section generally believe that disabled workers are less
productive, relative to their costs, than they truly are.
Myths and misconceptions about the low productivity or high
costs of individuals with disabilities are common.53 Many believe
51. See the exchange between Posner and Donohue, supra note 40.
52. These general arguments-according no weight to discriminatory preferences,
viewing the law as an attempt to change preferences, and addressing psychic costs to third
parties-also apply if labor market disadvantages arise, not because employers themselves
are prejudiced, but because they are attending to the prejudices of customers or other
employees. See Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra note 42, at 1347 n.34. In
addition, because employers may perceive aversion by customers or other employees as an
extra cost of hiring individuals with disabilities, the ADA can be viewed as imposing a hard
preference which prohibits an employer from relying on this type of cost. See infra Part III.
53. See Bruce G. Link et al., The Effectiveness of Stigma Coping Orientations: Can
Negative Consequences of Mental Illness Labeling be Avoided?, 32 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV.
302 (1991); Cressida Manning & Peter D. White, Attitudes of Employers to the Mentally Ill,
19 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 541 (1995); Jean-Frangois Ravaud et al., Discrimination Towards
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these inaccurate views are a major source of discrimination against
the disabled, and that a major purpose of the ADA is to break
through these employer myths by forcing employers to hire disabled
persons. 4 Once employers do so, under this vision, they will see
that disabled workers are more productive than they originally
thought.
In some cases, the ADA preferences may correct for entrenched
notions of normality that skew employer perceptions of cost and
productivity.55 Employers make many kinds of "accommodations"
for new employees. Employers see some accommodations, such as
paying for moving expenses, as "normal," while they view others,
such as one-time accommodations to individuals with disabilities,
as "abnormal." Even though both types of accommodations may
impose the same costs on employers, employers may be more
willing to pay "normal" costs, or, equivalently, may be more willing
to ignore them in their hiring calculus. This normality bias harms
individuals with disabilities by perpetuating a myth that they are
more costly. Similarly, employers may treat certain productivity
gaps, such as improper prior training, as "normal," while treating
others such as inability to do nonessential functions because of a
disability, as "abnormal." In this context, one can view the ADA's
preference as an attempt to break down the myths and to equalize
the treatment of normal and abnormal costs and productivity gaps.
Erroneous myths of this type, however, can last only if a market
failure causes employers to systematically ignore profitable
opportunities to hire undervalued workers. Any employer who
Disabled People Seeking Employment, 35 SOC. SCI. MED. 951 (1992).
54. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (noting Congress' acknowledgment
that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment"); Siefken v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664,666 (7th Cir. 1995) ('Congress perceived that employers were
basing employment decisions on unfounded stereotypes."); see also Peter David Blanck &
Mollie Weighner Marti,Attitudes, Behaviorand the EmploymentProvisions oftheAmericans
with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345 (1997).
55. For insightful discussions of the effect of notions of normality on perceptions of
individuals with disabilities, see DOUGLAS BAYNTON, FORBIDDEN SIGNS: AMERICAN CULTURE
AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIGN LANGUAGE 132-48 (1996); Douglas Baynton, The Bell
Curve: Disability as a Fundamental Justification for Inequality (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). See also LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY:
DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY (1995).
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ignores or defies the myths and hires the disabled would have a
competitive advantage on other employers.
The most plausible market-failure story here emphasizes the
public goods nature of information. For an individual employer, the
costs of testing the myth that the disabled have unfavorable
productivity/cost ratios may swamp the expected gains. First,
diversity amongst the population of individuals with disabilities
makes it costly to evaluate productivity accurately." Second, the
public goods nature of information about productivity undermines
incentives for employers to seek out better information. Although
information about the productivity of individuals with disabilities
is not a pure public good, it does exhibit both characteristics of a
public good: nonexcludability and nonrivalry of benefits.57 The
information exhibits nonexcludability because it would be very
difficult and expensive for an employer who gathers the information
to keep others from using it. Although an employer could attempt
to limit access to the information or charge for it, individuals with
disabilities and advocacy groups on their behalf have strong
interests in disseminating it. The information would likely leak out
as individuals with disabilities talked about their work experiences
and began to move naturally from job to job. The information also
exhibits nonrivalry; use of it by one employer does not diminish its
value to other employers. As a result, the entire market may be
underinformed because every employer has incentives to wait for
other employers to pay to develop better information. Thus, the
56. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Diversity within the group of
individuals with disabilities increases the costs of acquiring information about productivity.
If all individuals with disabilities had the same productivity, an employer would only need
to expend the amount required to determine productivity for one individual to determine
productivity for all. At the other extreme, complete heterogeneity would require resources
to be expended on each individual. Consequently, as heterogeneity in the group of individuals
with disabilities increases, so does the cost of acquiring information about their productivity.
In practice, employers probably place potential employees into quality classes (e.g.,
individuals without disabilities, individuals with mobility limitations, individuals with
mental disabilities) that assume both lower productivity and higher information costs as the
level of disability increases. Cf Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
659 (1979) (noting that the problem consumers face in searching for heterogeneous goods is
solved in part by segmenting goods into quality classes that are recognized by both firms and
consumers).
57. See TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 5-7 (1992).
2003] 1221
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
market equilibrium may be that all employers wait for the
information to be developed, and so the information is never
produced. 5
The ADA changes this set of incentives for employers. An
employer violates the ADA if it fails to hire a more productive
individual with a disability because of ignorance about either the
individual's productivity or the average productivity of individuals
with that type of disability. Ignorance about true productivity at the
time of hire is no defense. Thus, the ADA requires employers to
seek out better information, even if it would be individually rational
to act in ignorance instead.59
The key to the economic efficiency of the ADA on this point is the
difference between individual and social benefits and the rational
urge of employers to free ride on other employers. Ignorance may be
economically rational for each individual employer. The cost of
developing better productivity information may exceed the benefits
any individual employer would obtain by hiring the more productive
individuals with disabilities. The benefits to society overall,
however, may exceed the costs of developing the information. The
benefits to society overall would include both benefits to the
individual employer from the higher productivity of the individual
investigated and benefits to other employers who, because of the
public goods nature of the information, can free ride on the
information to hire other productive individuals with disabilities.
The existence of free riders alone, however, does not demonstrate
that individual employers will not develop accurate information
on their own, without any impetus from the ADA. If even a
few employers experiment and discover the high productivity of
58. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 145-46 (1965); SANDLER,
supra note 57, at 8-9.
59. Requiring private parties to develop information is one of the two common legislative
responses to inefficiencies that arise when information is unavailable because of a collective
action problem. The other common response is for the government to collect the information
itself. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 189-91 (1994). The
government fulfills the information collection function in part by attempting to be a model
employer of the disabled, thereby running experiments to test the productivity of disabled
workers given a chance to work. One can justify the ADA's mandate that private employers
also conduct experiments because the diversity amongst individuals with disabilities and
amongst the types of employers who might be interested in employing them prevents the
government-as-employer from being a complete and adequate laboratory.
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individuals with disabilities, this information will be used by other
employers as well, because it is nonexcludable.
To use the language of collective goods theory, if a privileged
group exists, it will develop productivity information despite some
free riders. A privileged group is an "individual or coalition whose
benefits from collective action exceed the associated costs, even if
these costs are solely borne by the individual or coalition.""
Assume, for example, that a very large employer anticipates
repeated use of the productivity information about disabled workers
once it is gathered. If the benefits of gathering the information
exceed the costs for that individual employer, it will gather the
information which will then be available for free use by all other
employers. Ironically, the public goods nature of the information
means that the weak (small employers) can take advantage of the
strong (large employers); large employers bear all of the costs of
developing information that is then used by others. In the United
States economy, of course, the largest employer is the government,
and the government has committed itself actively to employ
disabled persons. This "privileged" employer, then, may be
sufficient to break a cycle of myth about disabled workers. If so, the
information producing role of the ADA is unnecessary.
In sum, the employer ignorance rationale for the ADA has limited
force. Forcing employers to engage in costly experiments is not
profit maximizing for individual employers; employers must develop
information at an expected cost that will exceed expected benefits.
For society, however, the ADA may well be efficient. Because
information tends to be a public good, other employers may free ride
on the information to hire more productive employees. The
efficiency balance depends on whether the external benefits to other
employers exceed the difference between the costs and benefits for
the individual employer. This justification for the ADA should not
be pushed too far, however. At its core, the argument is no different
than the argument that employers have only a limited incentive to
discover whether copper or tin is a more cost effective input for
widgets because the knowledge that tin is better will quickly spread
to competitors. This may be so, but one would need to know much
60. SANDLER, supra note 57, at 9.
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more before advocating a law that forces widget producers to use
both copper and tin so that society can find out.
C. Employer Knowledge of Average Productivity
Individuals with disabilities may also suffer workplace
disadvantages, not because employers are ignorant about their
productivity, but because they are all too aware of it. If the average
productivity of a certain class of individuals with disabilities
(relative to their wage) is lower than that of other workers and if it
is too expensive for employers to make individual determinations
of productivity within that class, the profit maximizing employer
will rely on the lower average productivity and refuse to hire
individuals with disabilities, even if many are excellent workers.
This is known as statistical discrimination. Because it is expensive
to distinguish a particular, productive individual with a disability
from the class of persons with similar disabilities who have lower
average productivity, the employer is better off relying on the
statistical stereotype."' The distinction between the myths of the
previous section and the stereotypes of this section is that myths
are false. Stereotypes, on the other hand, are true on average, even
though they may not apply to all individuals in the group.
The ADA makes statistical discrimination illegal. Reasonable
accommodation requires an individual evaluation of individuals
with disabilities, even if the employer's own calculus indicates that
the cost of the evaluation exceeds the likely benefits. A showing
61. Statistical discrimination was first identified by Edmund Phelps and Kenneth Arrow.
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3
(Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of
Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972). It has been widely discussed in both
economic and legal scholarship on employment discrimination. In the economic literature,
see, for example, LESTER C. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS OF
DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 170-77 (1975); Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain,
Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175
(1977); Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention
in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340 (1983); Stewart J. Schwab, Is
Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 Am. ECON. REV. 228 (1986). In the legal literature,
see, for example, Donohue, Reply, supra note 40, at 531-33; McCaffery, supra note 25, at
608-15. For applications of the idea to disability discrimination, see Moss & Malin, supra
note 18, at 201-03; Willis, supra note 18, at 742-47.
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that a certain class of individuals with disabilities is less productive
on average than other applicants is not a defense under the ADA.
Indeed, statistical discrimination was specifically mentioned in the
ADA's legislative history as one type of prohibited discrimination.62
Statistical discrimination, like discrimination based on rational
ignorance, is profit maximizing for individual employers, but may
not be efficient overall. Statistical discrimination may distort the
incentives of individuals with disabilities to invest in their
productivity. To the extent that they are going to be treated as an
average member of the group with their disability, their incentives
to invest in their productivity are undermined. Individuals with
disabilities would be less likely to pursue educational opportunities
and engage in other activities that would make them more
productive members of society. Thus, society would lose the benefits
that individuals with disabilities could have contributed had they
invested more in their human capital. If those losses are larger than
the gains to employers from engaging in statistical discrimination,
the ADA's prohibition of statistical discrimination is efficient.63
Highly productive individuals in a group with low average
productivity will try to escape the stereotype. One way to do so is
for highly productive individuals with disabilities to invest more in
their human capital than they would otherwise to signal that they
do not share their disability group's average lower productivity.64
For example, if a college degree is easier for highly productive
workers to obtain than for less productive workers, the degree may
signal greater productivity and allow individuals to break the
stereotype. In this case, government intervention is not needed.
Although extra investment is plausible in many situations,
several factors make this an unlikely solution to the problem of
statistical discrimination against the disabled. First, even if this
type of extra investment occurs, the individual would continue to
62. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 58-59 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
340-41.
63. For this story in the economic literature, see THUROw, supra note 61; Lundberg &
Startz, supra note 61; Schwab, supra note 61. For this story in the legal literature, see
Donohue, Reply, supra note 40.
64. The classic model of signaling as a way of escaping stereotypes comes from A.
MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED
SCREENING PROCESSES (1974).
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have the disability and suffer from the perception of average lower
productivity. Within any investment class, for example, people with
college degrees, the individual would continue to suffer from
statistical discrimination. Although the extra investment may
signal that the individual is more productive than others without
the investment (here people without college degrees), the individual
could never escape the general effect of statistical discrimination.
Second, individuals with disabilities must make an extra in-
vestment to signal equal productivity. As Edward McCaffery has
said with regard to women, which could equally apply to individuals
with disabilities,
it is as if the market were telling women that they could get
high quality jobs, just like [men], but first they had to pay
$50,000. The fact that the barrier could be overcome, so that
women could get the jobs, hardlyjustifies ignoring the existence
of the barrier altogether. 65
Third, this story assumes that productivity information is
imperfect (knowable, but unknown to one party) rather than
incomplete (neither known, nor knowable).66 With imperfect
information, individuals with disabilities can make the extra
investments required to disclose inherently knowable information
about their productivity to employers. The knowability assumption
of imperfectness, however, may not apply. Much of the information
relevant to productivity in labor markets is inherently un-
knowable and, hence, must be estimated statistically. For example,
precise information about an individual's future attendance or
health prospects simply cannot be known-it must be estimated. 7
65. McCaffery, supra note 25, at 613. Analogizing McCaffery's story to the present
context, individuals with disabilities make the investment and get high quality jobs, but are
disadvantaged because they are required to expend resources on the extra investment.
Alternatively, individuals with disabilities may decide that the returns from the extra
investments are not worth the cost, so the investments would never be made. SPENCE, supra
note 64, at 176 ("The productivity gains attributable to the information content of market
signals may or may not justify the resource cost. Certainly one cannot assume that signaling
is more efficient than no-signaling.").
66. See McCaffery, supra note 25, at 612-13 (citing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 51-60 (1989)).
67. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1311, 1320 (1989).
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Similarly, the extra investment required to disclose productivity in
labor markets may be on-the-job experience. If so, and if individuals
with disabilities are unable to acquire on-the-job experience
because of preexisting statistical discrimination, the information
is unknowable and, hence, incomplete.6 8 For these reasons,
individuals with disabilities are unlikely to be able to take steps on
their own to counter the disadvantage they suffer from statistical
discrimination. Legal intervention may be necessary to break the
inefficient cycle.
In sum, profit maximizing employers may statistically dis-
criminate against individuals with disabilities, relying on the lower
average productivity of the group and refusing to incur the extra
costs of assessing individual productivity. The story here is similar
to the story against blacks and women. The ADA, like Title VII,
makes it illegal for employers to engage in statistical discrimination
that may foster efficiency.
One aspect of the ADA's ban on statistical discrimination avoids
a potential problem of other discrimination laws. In addition to
banning statistical discrimination, other discrimination laws
restrict testing, interviews, and other information that does not
"perfectly individuate" workers. 69 A perverse consequence is that
these restrictions encourage employers to rely on cruder, less
individuated stereotypes. By contrast, the ADA encourages
employers to interview individuals with disabilities and discuss
alternatives as part of the reasonable accommodation duty. As a
result of this encouragement of an express dialogue between
employer and worker about disability (in contrast to Title VII's near
prohibition of any dialogue about race or sex), the ADA allows
greater individuation and avoids some of the perverse encourage-
ment of statistical discrimination.
III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (HARD PREFERENCES) AS A
DISTINCT MODEL
The image underlying soft preferences is that of a disabled
individual who was not evaluated according to his true productivity
68. THUROW, supra note 61, at 176.
69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 40.
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and costs. The employer incurred extra psychic costs in employing
the disabled worker, erroneously thought that disabled workers
were less productive or more costly than they truly are, or
stereotypically lumped highly productive workers together with
other, less productive workers. The ADA's soft preferences protect
workers who are misperceived in these ways because of their
disabilities.
The ADA, however, extends beyond these soft preferences.
Suppose an employer accurately assesses the individual pro-
ductivity and costs of a disabled worker and determines that the
productivity/cost ratio is less than that of a nondisabled, competing
worker. Sometimes, the ADA allows the employer to hire the other
worker.7" At other times, however, the ADA requires a hard
preference for the disabled worker. If employing an individual with
a disability is more expensive due to the costs of accommodation or
because the applicant is less productive because he cannot perform
nonessential functions, the employer would violate the ADA by
refusing to hire that individual.71 The ADA requires employers to
ignore both the costs of accommodation and any productivity
achieved through the performance of nonessential functions unless
the accommodation is unreasonable or an undue hardship. These
are the hard preferences of the ADA.
70. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
an employer may hire a faster typist "notwithstanding the fact that the slower typist has a
disability"); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 119 (8th Cir. 1985) (disallowing a disability
claim where the employer hired a more qualified nondisabled candidate); Martin v. General
Mills, Inc., No. 95-C-2846, 1996 WL 648721, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1996) ("The ADA does
not require an employer to retain a less productive employee."); Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp.
1418, 1428 (D. Conn. 1987) (noting that a "significant loss of efficiency is not required" by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when, even though individual with a disability could perform the
job, it took him much longer to do it); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26 (1989) (using the
typing example to make the point that an "employer is still free to select the most qualified
applicant available and to make decisions based on reasons unrelated to the existence or
consequence of a disability").
71. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 39(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,462 ("An employer




A. Reasonable Accommodation in the Labor Market: Costs,
Productivity, and a Puzzle
From the employer's perspective, the costs of accommodation are
simply another cost (along with wages, employer taxes, and fringe
benefits) of hiring a worker. The ADA creates a hard preference for
individuals with disabilities because it requires employers to ignore
accommodation costs. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of this
preference. The comparator (C) in the figure is paid a wage of $15
per hour and produces fifteen widgets per hour. The first of three
individuals with disabilities (I1 ) has the same productivity as C, but
requires an accommodation costing $3 per hour. In the absence of
the ADA, the employer would prefer C because C produces the same
number of widgets for a lower total cost, and thus has a higher
productivity/cost ratio. The ADA, however, requires the employer
to ignore the cost of reasonable accommodations in making
employment decisions. Thus, the ADA creates a hard preference for
individuals with disabilities because it requires the employer to
treat C and Vi as equal even though C has a productivity/cost
advantage.
122920031
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW







The second individual with a disability (2) also requires an
accommodation costing $3 per hour, but 12 is more productive than
C and produces eighteen widgets per hour. In the absence of the
ADA, the employer would be neutral between C and 12. For both,
the ratio of total productivity to costs is 1 (C= 15/$15; 12= 18/$18).
Once again, however, the ADA requires the employer to ignore the
cost of the accommodation. Thus, the ADA requires the employer to
favor 12 as having a higher productivity/cost ratio (treating 12 as a
18/$15 worker). Again, the ADA creates a hard preference because
the employer would violate the ADA unless it hired 12 instead of C,
even though the two are equal from a labor market perspective.
Finally, a third individual with a disability (I") is also more
productive than C, and produces eighteen widgets per hour. This
time the accommodation cost is considerably greater-$9 per hour
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rather than $3 per hour. In the absence of the ADA, the employer
would clearly prefer to hire C. C's productivity/cost ratio is still 1,
whereas I3's is 0.75 (18/$24). Unless the costs of accommodation
become unreasonable or impose an undue hardship, the ADA
requires the employer to ignore them. Thus, the employer must
treat Ii's productivity/cost ratio as identical to that of 12, by not
counting the extra $9 per hour accommodation. Once again, the
ADA creates a hard preference by requiring the employer to prefer
I to C, even though a profit-maximizing employer prefers C.
One puzzle with the ADA is that it favors cost accommodations
more than productivity accommodations. In general, the ADA
mandates a hard preference for disabled persons who are more
costly but as productive as other workers. The ADA does not
mandate a hard preference for disabled persons who are no more
costly but less productive than other workers.72 The market would
treat these two types of persons as equivalent, but the law does not.
Figure 3 illustrates this puzzle. Compare applicant I" to 1'. Both
have productivity/cost ratios of 0.83. Applicant I produces as much
as the nondisabled comparator, but costs the employer twenty
percent more. Applicant 1V costs no more than C, but C produces
twenty percent more. This could arise, for example, with a disability
that reduces productivity and has no known accommodation. The
employer is indifferent between the two individuals with
disabilities, and would prefer C to either of them. Yet the ADA
treats the two applicants very differently. The ADA gives 1V a hard
preference, requiring the employer to ignore the accommodation
costs and to treat 1V and C the same. The ADA gives no hard
preference to I, and would let the employer choose C instead. As a
further illustration of the puzzle, the employer would least like to
hire I of all the individuals identified in the figure, because of the
large costs of accommodation. As long as the accommodation is
reasonable, however, the ADA would require the employer to rank
I first (tied with 1V, and above C).
72. See cases cited supra note 70; see also Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace
Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 894 (1997) (remarking that the ADA "does not
require the employer to hire or retain a qualified individual with a covered disability,
regardless of the need for accommodation, over an equally or more qualified individual
without a disability").
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One resolution of this puzzle is to deny it by arguing that the law
does force employers to accommodate workers with lower pro-
ductivity through the "essential functions" doctrine. The ADA only
protects qualified individuals with a disability, defined as persons
who can perform the "essential functions" of the job.7" An employer
must treat an individual with disabilities as qualified if she can
perform the essential functions, even if she cannot perform all of
the functions of the job."' From a labor market perspective, the
ability to perform a variety of job functions is one component of
productivity. In the absence of the ADA, employers would consider
all aspects of productivity, and would tend to favor the worker who
can perform essential and nonessential functions. The ADA's
"essential functions" requirement, however, requires employers to
compare the productivity of disabled and other workers only along
their essential functions. An individual with a disability must be
treated as equal to another worker if both can perform the essential
functions of the job equally, even if only the other worker can
make an additional contribution to productivity by performing
nonessential functions. Returning to Figure 3, if the productivity
gap between C and I" arises from nonessential functions, the ADA
would require the employer to treat the two applicants as
equivalent, despite I"s lower overall productivity, just as the ADA
requires the employer to treat C and I as equivalent, despite Il's
greater overall costs.
The essential functions doctrine only alters the outcome in
some circumstances-namely those in which the individual with a
disability's productivity in essential functions equals that of other
workers, even if his "full" productivity is somewhat less. When a
disability lowers the productivity in essential functions, the puzzle
remains. For example, if an individual with a disability is ten
percent less productive in the essential functions of a job, the
employer need not accommodate. However, the employer must
accommodate an equally productive worker with ten percent
greater costs.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
74. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(nX) (2002).
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A second resolution is to admit that the ADA treats costs and
productivity differently, and then justify the difference. One justifi-
cation is that costs generally can be identified with fair precision
and reported on a standard cardinal measure. Productivity, on
the other hand, is much more varied in how it is measured and
is often not amenable to a cardinal measure at all. Compared to
costs, courts would have great difficulty policing a mandate that
employers reasonably accommodate deficient productivity. It is one
thing to have a court determine whether two applicants were
equally productive or qualified; it places a far greater burden on
courts to determine whether one applicant is ten percent or thirty
percent less productive.
A third resolution is more political. Advocates for the disabled
emphasize that disabled persons can contribute as much to the
economy as nondisabled workers, with the helping hand of
reasonable accommodation. This is consistent with our merito-
cractic ideal that jobs should go to the most qualified applicant. The
argument that less productive workers with lesser costs are
functionally equivalent to more productive, greater cost workers
may fail to persuade politically. The ADA's sponsors and
proponents may have been reluctant to expand the command of
reasonable accommodation for fear of undermining overall support.
In sum, the ADA requires two types of accommodation. It
requires employers to spend resources to accommodate disabled
workers who can be as productive as other workers. It also requires
employers to examine relative productivity only for the essential
functions of the job. These two hard preferences are central to a
proper understanding of the ADA. If the ADA's key obligations are
viewed as less than hard preferences, they simply cannot carry the
load intended for them, which is to ensure that individuals with
disabilities are afforded a fair opportunity to participate fully in the
labor market.
B. Stylized Hypotheticals under the ADA and Title VII
Three stylized hypotheticals will help to bring the ADA's hard
preferences into better focus and highlight differences between the
ADA's reasonable accommodation model and Title VII's disparate
treatment and disparate impact models.
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Consider first a bare-bones hypothetical highlighting differences
between reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment. An
employer entertains job applications and rejects two applicants, the
first because she is a woman, the second because she has a
disability. Do the rejected applicants have good claims?
The woman has a good Title VII disparate treatment claim. This
is explicit, intentional discrimination because of sex. The only
defense under Title VII would be that sex was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).7  Importantly, cost complaints
that women are more expensive are not part of a BFOQ defense.76
The only question is whether all or substantially all women cannot
perform the job at hand, or whether it is impossible to test on an
individual basis." Courts narrowly construe the BFOQ test so as
not to swamp Title VII's general command to ignore the sex of
workers.78
The disabled worker may also have a good claim, but it is much
more fragile than the woman's claim. The ADA prohibits employers
from considering disability in an invidious or stereotypical way.
Unlike Title VII, however, the ADA contemplates that employers
will often consider disability in a legitimate way. Indeed, as we
shall discuss, the reasonable accommodation mandate requires
employers to consider disability.79 The employer can avoid ADA
liability if the worker cannot perform the essential requirements of
the job, even with reasonable accommodation, or if the reasonable
accommodation would be an undue hardship on the employer.80 The
reasonable accommodation inquiry is different in kind from the
BFOQ inquiry. Most importantly, cost considerations are the heart
of the matter under the ADA, while they are banned under Title
VII. Mere consideration of sex exposes an employer to considerable
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
76. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) ("The extra cost of
employing members of one sex, however, does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense
for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender.") (citing L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 & n.32 (1978)).
77. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414-17 (1985).
78. See generally HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIzABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.3, at 123-28 (2001) (describing the BFOQ defense).




risk of a Title VII violation; the BFOQ exception is very narrow.81
Consideration of disability, on the other hand, merely opens the
door to ADA analysis; reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship often provide a defense to liability.
Consider a second hypothetical illustrating the difference
between the ADA's reasonable accommodation approach and Title
VII's disparate impact model. Suppose a job requires frequent
lifting of eighty pound sacks. The employer screens applicants by
testing whether they can lift an eighty-pound sack. A woman and
a person in a wheelchair are rejected because they could not lift the
sack. How do their claims fare?
The woman has a clear but weak impact claim under Title VII.
She can likely show that the test has a disparate impact on women.
But the employer has a good defense that the test is job related
and consistent with business necessity.8 2 If the employer can show
this, the woman's claim is defeated. The court will not inquire into
whether the eighty pound sacks could be split into forty pound
components. Title VII examines the test, not the job. By contrast,
the rejected disabled applicant can challenge the job itself. The
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement requires the
employer to consider dividing the eighty pound sacks as a method
of accommodation. 3
A third hypothetical presents a more plausible possibility that
Title VII, like the ADA, explicitly imposes costs on employers.
Consider a situation in which an employer refuses to hire a
female salesperson because customers would be less willing to buy
from her. Following Becker's analysis84 and the airline hostess
81. The contrast between Title VII and the ADA is even sharper with respect to race
discrimination. The BFOQ exception in Title VII does not extend to race. Instead of the
limited BFOQ defense available for sex discrimination, there is no statutory defense for race
discrimination. See William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a
Statutory Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L.
REV. 211 (1998) (arguing that race is sometimes relevant to employment decisions and,
therefore, that the BFOQ defense ought to be extended). But see Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of
Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 652-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980) (indicating
in dicta that a race BFOQ may be appropriate in some circumstances).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
83. See id. § 12111(9XB) (listing job restructuring as a type of reasonable
accommodation); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that ADA § 101(9)(B) may require employer to restructure mechanic's job).
84. BECKER, supra note 29, at 75-81 (applying general discrimination model to
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cases, 5 the first blush approach to this is that Title VII prohibits
not only discrimination by employers directly, but also employer
attempts to cater to customer (or co-employee) discrimination.
Therefore, the employer's refusal to hire would be illegal. However,
this would impose costs on the employer in much the same way as
the ADA does, in this case by requiring the employer to hire an
employee who will be less productive."M The problem with this
argument is that Title VII does not require the employer to hire the
woman and absorb these costs. Although the airline hostess cases
have language indicating that employers cannot attend to the
discriminatory preferences of customers,"' the holding in the cases
was that the employer could not demonstrate that male hostesses
would be less effective.' When employers can prove that employees
of a particular sex will be less productive because of discriminatory
customer preferences, they win the cases. 9 Once again, Title VII
shies away from imposing costs on employers. 90
More generally, Title Vii's soft preferences model and the ADA's
hard preferences model differ in the express economic burden
imposed on employers. A legislator supporting Title VII could say
with a straight face that Congress imposed no costs on employers.
An employer who hires the most qualified person without regard
to race or sex will not violate Title VI's prohibition of disparate
treatment and will see increases in profits as well. Title VII's
disparate impact model allows employers to use any test that is job
discrimination by customers).
85. E.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,389 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding
that a female only requirement for flight attendant was not a BFOQ under Title VII), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
86. Note that because of the puzzling distinction in the ADA between cost
accommodations and productivity accommodations, the ADA may not require an
accommodation for the less productive employee in the hypothetical. In the hypothetical, the
employee is less productive, and hence, not entitled to any accommodation.
87. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387-88.
88. Id. at 388-89.
89. EEOC v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 710 F.2d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding
it permissible to hire people under the age of forty-five as campus police officers because they
are better able to deal with students); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1364
(D. Del. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding refusal to hire male nursing
home attendants because of customer preference for females).
90. In this case, the ADA also would not impose these particular costs on the employer,
but only because of its puzzling distinction between cost accommodations and productivity
accommodations, not because of a general statutory policy against imposing costs.
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related and consistent with business necessity. If the test is not job
related, it is not helping the employer's profitability anyway.
As applied, of course, Title VII's: impact is more complex.
Employers often complain bitterly about the costs imposed by Title
VII. But the first cut is that Title VII imposes no costs. This differs
dramatically from the ADA's reasonable accommodation model.
Congress consciously and deliberately required employers to spend
money to accommodate disabled workers. Although Congress
thought the costs were worthwhile, no one can claim with a straight
face that the ADA imposes no costs on employers.
C. Professor Jolls and the Equivalence of Accommodation and
Antidiscrimination
In an important article,Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
Professor Jolls has staked out a different position on the nature of
the accommodation model. In sharp contrast to our approach,
Professor Jolls does not see the accommodation model as a distinct
model. Rather, she finds "simply ... no way, as a factual matter, to
distinguish [certain] aspects of antidiscrimination from require-
ments of accommodation." 9' Jolls defines accommodation broadly to
mean
a legal rule that requires employers to incur special costs in
response to the distinctive needs ... of particular, identifiable
demographic groups of employees, such as individuals with
(observable) disabilities, and imposes this requirement in
circumstances in which the employer has no intention of
treating the group in question differently on the basis of group
membership....'
Because Title VII disparate impact cases impose costs on employers
based on distinctive traits of identifiable groups, JoUs argues these
cases are functionally equivalent to accommodation cases.
We have two basic responses to Jolls' position. One response
questions Jolls' two-part definition of accommodation as entailing
91. Jolls, supra note 11, at 651; see also Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53
STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000).
92. Jolls, supra note 11, at 648.
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special costs to a group without an intent to treat the group
differently. The other response emphasizes the difference between
judicial restructuring of jobs (typical of ADA accommodation cases
but not Title VII cases) and judicial scrutiny of selection procedures
(typical of Title VII cases). Being the careful scholar she is, Jolls
anticipates our responses, but we remain unconvinced. Our
disagreement is of the "cup half full or half empty" variety. Where
Jolls sees connections between accommodation and impact cases
(and clearly there are some), we see differences (and clearly there
are some). We believe most current cases support our viewpoint.
As our conclusion states, however, we predict that courts will
increasingly import ADA accommodation principles into Title VII
cases. Jolls sees courts already doing this, while we think she is a
decade early.
The standard judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact
case requires the employer to change the policy or standard for
everybody, not just the protected group. For example, to take the
facts from the famous Griggs case, if a high school diploma
requirement has a disparate impact on blacks that cannot be
justified by business necessity, a Title VII court would order the
employer to drop the requirement for whites as well as blacks. By
contrast, a successful ADA reasonable accommodation case requires
the employer to take special steps to a particular group, but not for
everybody.
As a counterexample to this standard difference, Jolls points to
the Title VII no-beard cases, where courts have allowed employers
to continue a no-beard policy for white workers even while courts
exempt black workers with pseudofolliculitis barbae from the
policy.93 The Title VII no-beard cases look like accommodation
cases. But Jolls concedes that the "more usual approach in the
disparate impact arena outside of the no-beard cases"9' is to strike
down the practice for everyone. She argues that even the standard
judicial remedy is accommodation, however, because it makes one
group more costly to employers than another.95 Maybe so, but the
expressly tailored remedy in the typical accommodation case (e.g.,
93. See id. at 653-56.
94. Id. at 655.
95. Id. at 655-56.
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pay for a reader for a blind employee96 ) strikes us as qualitatively
different than the workplace-wide remedy in the usual disparate
impact case.
Second, and more importantly, Jolls disagrees with our argument
that Title VII generally examines selection criteria, while only the
ADA's accommodation requirement looks to restructuring jobs
themselves. Jolls argues that Title VII cases sometimes involve job
restructuring as well. From our vantage point, the vast bulk of Title
VII cases only scrutinize selection criteria, and allow the employer
to define the job any way it wants. In a few areas, we concede, some
Title VII cases scrutinizejob characteristics, but even in these areas
the courts are extremely reluctant to do so. By contrast, forcing
employers to restructure jobs is the core of the ADA.
Professor Jolls discusses four examples to illustrate her position:
grooming rules, job selection criteria, English-only rules, and
pregnancy. All of these examples share the same limitations. We
focus first on Professor Jolls' discussion of grooming rules to
highlight the differences in our positions and, we think, to illustrate
the strength of our claim that accommodation is a distinct model.
We then look more briefly at the other examples.
Professor Jolls' prototypical case of facially-neutral grooming
rules is Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.9" In Bradley, the
employer required employees to be clean-shaven. The plaintiff
satisfied the court that this requirement had a disparate impact on
black men because they disproportionately have a skin condition
which makes shaving impossible. The court then rejected the
employer's business justification that the no-beard rule was
necessary because the public reacted negatively to delivery men
with beards.98
Professor Jolls argues that this case, which applies Title VII's
disparate impact doctrine, is indistinguishable from an accom-
modation requirement. First, she says, the employer did not intend
to treat members of a particular group of employees differently
because of group membership. Second, she argues that because of
96. See Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d
Cir. 1984) (requiring employer to pay for reader under Rehabilitation Act).
97. 939 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1991) (Bradley 1); 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993) (Bradley I). Jolls'
discussion of Bradley is taken from Jolls, supra note 11, at 653-56.
98. Bradley /, 7 F.3d at 798-99.
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the employer's concern about public reaction to bearded delivery
men, the rule had a business justification and, thus to abrogate the
rule would impose real financial costs on the employer.9
Let us consider both of these reasons, in the context of a
comparable, hypothetical disability claim. Let us say that Pizzaco
of Nebraska also had a rule that pizza delivery employees must
walk up driveways, and thus could not use wheelchairs.' 00
Professor Jolls argues first that the court's treatment of the no-
beard rule is like an accommodation claim because the employer
had no adverse intent. This claim is curious because disability cases
with no adverse intent are rare, maybe nonexistent.'0' An employer
with a no-wheelchairs rule clearly would be intending to
discriminate against this class of individuals with disabilities, even
if the employer also had business reasons for the rule. The
important point here, however, is the significantly different
consequences adverse intent has in our two cases. If the employer
had acted with the intention to treat black men differently in
Bradley, the employer would have lost, period. No business
justification would have been considered because no business
justification will justify intentional discrimination. When the
employer acts with adverse intent in our no-wheelchairs hypo-
thetical, the evidence merely leads to a consideration of the
employer's business justification. The employer may or may not
lose, depending on the strength of its justification and the nature of
99. Jolls, supra note 11, at 654.
100. The hypothetical is similar to PGA Tour, Inc., v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), in
which the Supreme Court struck down the PGA's rule against golf carts in professional
tournaments as applied to Casey Martin, a professional golfer suffering from a circulatory
disorder that made walking difficult. Martin was not an employment case. Rather, it
concerned the public accommodation title (Title III) of the ADA. The Court determined that
Martin was a "customer" of the PGA's tournaments and thus was covered by Title 11, and
that allowing him to use a golf cart was not a modification that would "fundamentally alter
the nature" of professional golf tournaments. Id. at 681-82.
101. As under Title VII, a disability case without evidence of adverse intent would appear
as a disparate impact case. But even though the ADA explicitly recognizes disparate impact
as a cognizable model of discrimination under the Act, almost no ADA disability disparate
impact cases exist. The leading disability disparate impact case cited in the textbooks is still
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), a pre-ADA case which rejected a disability
disparate impact claim under the Rehabilitation Act when the state of Tennessee reduced
the number of inpatient days its Medicaid program would pay hospitals.
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accommodations it could make. This strikes us as a significant
difference, not an equivalence.
Professor Jolls' second point is that, because the no-beard rule
had a business justification, requiring the employer to abandon it
imposed real economic costs on the employer and, therefore, the
case was like an accommodation case. The court's holding in
Bradley, however, is that the no-beard rule did not have a business
justification.0 2 Professor Jolls says that the rule did have a
business justification because the employer presented a survey
indicating that up to twenty percent of the employer's customers
"would react negatively" to a delivery person wearing a beard. But
the court rejected the study as not showing significant customer
apprehension regarding beards,0 3 and in any event involving
customer preference rather than Domino's ability to make or deliver
pizzas. The court found it "[slignificant G" that the survey made "no
showing that customers would order less pizza" if Domino's allowed
beards,' which suggests that the court would have upheld the no-
beard rule if the study could have demonstrated that it imposed a
real economic cost.
Compare the court's actual result with the likely result in our
alternative hypothetical. If the employer could not show that
accommodating nonambulatory delivery people would impose
economic costs, the employer's rule clearly would be struck down.
This result is analogous to the no-beard result. On the other hand,
if the employer could show that accommodating delivery people who
could not walk would impose $X worth of costs, the employer might
or might not be required to absorb those costs, depending on
whether they were reasonable. This was not the case the Bradley
court faced. Instead, the court found that the employer had failed
to demonstrate that rejection of the no-beard rule would impose any
costs. But the court's dicta clearly indicated that the rule would
have been upheld if it had imposed costs on the employer in the
form of lower pizza sales.
102. Bradley H, 7 F.3d at 798-99.
103. Id. at 799 ("Even if the survey results indicated a significant customer apprehension
regarding beards, which they do not, the results would not constitute evidence of a sufficient
business justification defense for Domino's strict no-beard policy.").
104. Id.
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More generally, as Professor Jolls says, the no-beard cases blur
the line between selection criterion and job restructuring. A clean-
shaven face is both a criterion for hiring and part of the job. But it
is not an important part of the job (or, to use the ADA's language,
an essential function of the job) because it merely responds to
customer preferences-a notorious justification for employer
practices throughout discrimination law. More importantly for us,
the no-beard cases demonstrate the courts' reluctance to restructure
jobs. If the beards truly would harm an employer's bottom-line
profits, courts will not interfere with the employer's no-beard rule.
This reluctance to interfere differs dramatically from the courts'
approach to ADA accommodation cases involving job restructuring.
It also differs from the courts' approach in Title VII selection
criteria cases, where courts are far more willing to strike down
employer policies unless the employer demonstrates a very clear
business justification.
Cases challenging facially neutral hiring tests-Professor Jolls'
second example 1 05 -also fail to persuade us that impact and
accommodation cases are closely linked. These fact patterns create
the most familiar type of disparate impact claim. Our basic point is
that these (often successful) challenges to selection criteria differ
fundamentally from challenges to job structures (which are often
successful in ADA reasonable accommodation claims but much less
successful in Title VII cases). Jolls emphasizes that when these
Title VII selection-criteria cases succeed, they can impose real costs
on employers, just as successful accommodation cases can impose
real costs on employers. But antitrust cases can also impose real
costs on firms. That does not make them like accommodation cases.
And although we agree that successful disparate impact cases can
impose costs on employers (even though in theory striking down a
test that is not job related should benefit employers rather than
impose costs), the interesting question is which type of cases have
the highest burden and thus impose the greatest costs. As we
survey the cases, the burden is highest in abstract testing cases (the
classic example being IQ tests) where the employer believes that
higher test-scorers are better workers, but cannot demonstrate it to
a court. Courts are more lenient on employers when the test and
105. Jolls, supra note 11, at 656-58.
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the job are more intertwined. Thus, courts in disparate impact
cases are most intrusive on employer selection procedures when the
procedures differ greatly from the job, and least intrusive when a
court order might require restructuring the job. Accommodation
cases, by contrast, focus on restructuring the job.
To see the reluctance of courts to discard tests that are closely
related to the job, consider Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority," a case highlighted by Professor Jolls.
Here, the employer required applicants for transit police officers to
run 1.5 miles in twelve minutes, arguably a job related criteria
because they might have to chase suspects on foot. Women filed a
disparate-impact lawsuit. Professor Jolls emphasizes that the
appellate court reversed ajudgment for the employer and remanded
the case for a determination of business necessity. The trial court
ultimately found for the employer, however, thus making this a
weak case for demonstrating that disparate impact cases financially
burden employers (other than through litigation costs). More
importantly, throughout the litigation there was no hint that the
employer should restructure the job so that police officers would
not have to chase suspects so long on foot. The entire inquiry
was whether this was indeed a job requirement, and if so whether
the twelve minute test was related to it. This inquiry differs
dramatically from an ADA accommodation inquiry, which would
center on, rather than bypass completely, the question of whether
employers could accommodate officers who cannot chase suspects
over long distances.
The height and weight requirements at issue in Dothard v.
Rawlinson °7 also illustrate the reluctance of courts to restructure
jobs. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down an employer's
minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards, which
had a disparate impact on women.0 8 The employer argued the
requirements were related to strength, but the Court reasoned that
the employer could directly test for strength if that were truly a
necessary part of the job. °9 Interesting is Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence, in which he argued that the employer would have won
106. 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
107. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
108. Id. at 331.
109. Id.
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if it had argued that the appearance of strength-rather than
strength itself-was part of the job.11 In that case, large height
and weight would directly be part of the prison guard's job, and
thus untouchable under Title VII.'" Title VII would strike down,
however, height and weight requirements that merely test for job
attributes.
Professor Jolls' third example involves the litigation around
English-only rules.112 In these cases, the employer imposes the
English language as an element of the job, which has a disparate
impact on the basis of national origin. The plaintiffs in these
Title VII cases ask courts to strike down the English language
rules, which would be a job restructuring along the reasonable
accommodation model rather than simply a changing of the
selection criterion which is the hallmark of disparate impact
litigation. Thus, if plaintiffs generally succeeded in the English-only
cases, we would agree with Professor Jolls that they provide an
example of the blurring of the disparate impact and accommodation
models. But plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful here.
Professor Jolls emphasizes two settled cases where the employer
agreed to change its English-only job requirements, but Jolls herself
cites at least five cases where courts upheld English-only rules. The
case law seems to be against the example here that would equate
the disparate impact and accommodation models.
In contrast to the weakness of Title VII disparate impact claims
against English-only rules, consider how an ADA challenge to
such a rule might fare. Suppose a worker could show he was
psychologically unable to speak at all because he was prevented
from speaking his native language at work. This worker would be
substantially impaired in the major life activity of talking, and the
court would presumably make a serious inquiry into whether
the employer could reasonably accommodate him by modifying
the English-only rule. Unless the English-only rule is extremely
important to the business (and everyone has doubts about this), the
ADA claim would be strong.
110. Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 340 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
112. Jolla, supra note 11, at 658-60.
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Professor Jolls' final example, the pregnancy cases, are perhaps
the most important."' Courts restructuring jobs to accommodate
the needs of pregnant (or breastfeeding) women might significantly
alter workplace relations. Professor Jolls admits that the leading
cases do not support her view, but she thinks they are mistaken.
Nevertheless, the cases do represent the current state of the law.
To our mind, the hesitancy of courts to uphold disparate impact
pregnancy claims is the reluctance of courts to restructure
jobs under Title VII. In the pregnancy cases, courts require
employers to treat pregnant women as favorably as other similarly
disabled employees,11' but do not require special accommodation.
115
Summarizing the recent Title VII pregnancy cases, a leading
treatise finds two themes. First, "that pregnant employees are
entitled to treatment equal to that given to similarly situated
nonpregnant employees," but second, "that special accommodation
or preference relating to pregnancy is not required.""' In the Title
VII pregnancy cases, then, courts view accommodation as very
113. Id. at 660-65.
114. See Byrd v. Lakeshore Hosp., 30 F.3d 1380,1383 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding a violation
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act where employer fired pregnant employee for using ten
days of sick leave, while allowing sick leave to nonpregnant employees).
115. See Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner,
J.) (upholding summary judgment for employer who fired pregnant employee for
absenteeism, declaring that "concept of disparate impact does not stretch to subsidize a class
of workers"); Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Tex., 143 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
employer's refusal to allow pregnant nurse to return to work when her doctor advised her
not to lift over 150 pounds, because employer applied same lifting requirement to
nonpregnant employees); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that airline was not required to provide a light-duty assignment for ticketing agent
with pregnancy-related lower back discomfort because light-duty jobs were not given to other
workers injured while off duty); Armstrong v. Flower Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir.
1994) (affirming summary judgment for employer who fired pregnant home health care nurse
who refused to treat HIV patient, declaring that Congress intended the pregnancy
discrimination amendments to Title VII to end discrimination against pregnant employees,
but not to require preferential treatment); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738
(7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (upholding summary judgment for employer who fired pregnant
employee chronically absent because of morning sickness, reasoning that disparate impact
liability was not a warrant for favoritism); Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1984)
(declaring that nothing in Title VII compels an employer to prefer for alternative
employment a pregnant employee unable to perform her full range of duties).
116. BARBARA LINDEMANN &PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENTDISCRMNATION LAW 13.5.A
(3d ed. Supp. 2000).
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different from the disparate treatment or impact models of
discrimination, and not part of the statute's mandates.
That Title VII does not require special accommodation is even
clearer in breastfeeding cases, and other maternity cases not
directly related to the mother's medical condition. Courts are
extremely reluctant to entertain claims that Title VII requires
employers to lengthen breaks or otherwise assist working
mothers. For example, in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc.,117 the court
summarily dismissed a worker's Title VII claim when the employer
refused to provide a part-time schedule to accommodate a nursing
mother." 8 While the court entertained claims of possible violations
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, it declared that Title VII does
not require accommodation of child-care concerns." 9 The courts'
hostility to accommodation in these cases contrasts sharply with
the serious way in which courts in ADA cases investigate whether
employers can alter job schedules to accommodate workers with
disabilities.
Our central criticism is not that there are no commonalities
between antidiscrimination and accommodation. Rather, as we see
it, the central thrust of antidiscrimination and accommodation are
different, and accommodation imposes greater and more explicit
burdens on employers. Under Title VII's disparate impact doctrine,
the courts explicitly look for economic costs. If found, the analysis
ends and the employer wins. Accommodation is different. The
courts also examine economic costs imposed on employers but, when
found, the analysis has just begun. The ADA, at its core, requires
employers to absorb these costs unless they are unreasonable or
create an undue hardship; Title VII, at its core, avoids imposing
these costs on employers. 20
117. 960 F. Supp 1487 (D. Colo. 1997); see also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.3d 927 (4th Cir.
1988) (upholding employer's rejection of request for six-month maternity leave, declaring
that an employee is not entitled to dictate managerial decisions affecting the employment
relationship).
118. Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at 1492.
119. Id.
120. Although approaching the issue from a different perspective, Samuel Issacharoff and
Justin Nelson generally agree with us. They find that the "overwhelming sweep" of ADA
cases do not concern"discrimination simpliciter," but rather "a claimed failure to redistribute
in the form of accommodation." Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with A
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with
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D. Comparing Preferences Elsewhere
The ADA's hard preferences can also be brought into better focus
by comparing them with preferences elsewhere in employment law.
In the law generally, preferences of the same general type as the
ADA's, which require actors to ignore certain information in making
decisions, are common,121 which suggests that the mere presence of
the preferences should not produce skepticism. Compared to other
preferences in employment law, however, the ADA's are unusual.
Title VII itself contains hard preferences in an attenuated sense.
To the extent race or sex may be a signal of productivity, the
argument could be made that Title VII imposes a hard preference
because it prohibits reliance on that signal. That is, by prohibiting
statistical discrimination, Title VII requires employers to ignore
information relevant to productivity.'22 Even viewed in this way,
however, Title VII's hard preference is distinct and softer than the
ADA's. First, Title VII prohibits using race and sex as a signal of
productivity when the employer relies on thegroup's characteristics
as a proxy for individual productivity. Title VII, however, does not
prohibit reliance on the productivity characteristics of individual
women or members of minority groups. Indeed, one of the primary
goals of Title VII is to encourage precisely that type of individual
consideration. The ADA's preference, in contrast, is stronger
because it prohibits not only use of disability as a group-based
proxy for productivity, but also use of the productivity charac-
teristics of individual workers with disabilities. For example,
consider the treatment of pregnancy under Title VII. Although an
Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 311 (2001). Thus, even though Title VII and the ADA
overlap, "only the ADA finds its primary statutory concern in the anticipated shift of
resources to its intended beneficiaries." Id. at 357.
121. See, e.g., Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4003(c) (2) (2000) (forbidding
banks from relying on "any class of checks or persons" in extending time for payment of
checks); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2000) (limiting information that can
be disclosed on credit reports); FED. R. EVID. 404 (limiting character evidence); id. 408
(limiting evidence of settlement negotiations); id. 410 (denying admissibility of pleas); id. 412
(curtailing evidence of past sexual behavior); id. 501 (governing privileges); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-447 (West 2000) (proclaiming that similar to restrictions in other states, race
cannot be used to make distinctions or rate determinations in life insurance).
122. See supra Part I.C.
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employer cannot rely on stereotypical notions about pregnancy in
making a decision about an employee, it can act adversely if it bases
its decision on the particular circumstances of the worker and the
productivity needs of the business.1" The ADA, in contrast, not only
requires the employer to refrain from making stereotypical, group-
based assumptions about the productivity of individuals with
disabilities, it also requires the employer to ignore information
about the cost and productivity of particular individuals with
disabilities. Specifically, the ADA requires employers, in making
hiring and firing decisions, to ignore the cost of reasonable
accommodations required by an individual worker and to ignore the
individual worker's poor productivity in nonessential functions of
the job.
Viewing Title VII's prohibition of statistical discrimination as a
hard preference highlights differences in the underlying assump-
tions of the two acts. Under Title VII, a primary underlying
assumption of the law is that race and sex are irrelevant to
productivity.12' The assumption is so strong that it applies even in
circumstances where it may not be true as a prophylactic against
more widespread violations."2 In contrast, the ADA's preference
relies on the assumption that disability is relevant to costs and
productivity. Employers are required to make reasonable accom-
modations because, without them, individuals with disabilities may
not be as productive as others. Employers may consider only the
ability to perform the essential functions of the job because
individuals with disabilities may not be able to perform all
functions. Under Title VII, employers are required to ignore race
and sex even when it may be relevant to productivity because in the
123. See, e.g., Marafimo v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983);
Ahmad v. Loyal Am. Life Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
124. For an early and important articulation of this assumption, see Owen M. Fiss, A
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 235 (1971).
125. See, e.g., L.A. Dep't of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1978)
(finding that employers cannot use the fact that women live longer than men to require
larger pension contributions from women); Fernandezv. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273,1276-
77 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the reluctance of Latin American and Southeast Asian
customers to conduct business with women did not justify the company's failure to promote
a woman to an international marketing position); Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 967 F. Supp.
472, 475 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that an employer cannot match black and white callers
with similar voters in a "get out the vote" effort).
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vast majority of cases it is not, and the rule avoids having to engage
in difficult inquiries to determine if employers used race and sex
legitimately (for example, as a signal of productivity) or
illegitimately. Under the ADA, employers are required to ignore
information about the cost and productivity of individuals with
disabilities because of the assumption that the information will be
true and relevant so often that, unless employers were legally
required to ignore it, individuals with disabilities would be at too
severe a disadvantage in the labor market.
The ADA's preferences are also distinct from laws which require
employers to ignore information in a variety of insurance situations.
For example, employers must ignore the utility of sex in predicting
longevity when establishing a pension system, 26 the potential extra
costs of preexisting conditions when offering health insurance,'
27
and the costs of pensions when making many employment
decisions." These are hard preferences. Employers, if permitted,
would use the prohibited information to predict the cost of
employing (or continuing to employ) an individual. For example, a
preexisting medical condition is likely to increase the cost of
employing an individual and the imminent vesting of a pension will
increase the cost of retaining an employee. Employers may prefer
to use the information to avoid, or at least minimize, those costs.
These Title VII hard preferences are also distinct from the hard
preferences under the ADA in two fundamental ways. First, the
Title VII preferences usually apply in an insurance context when a
primary object is the pooling of risks. In these contexts, the laws
prohibit employers from relying on certain factors to separate
individuals from a broader pool, for example, sex in separating
women from the general pension pool or preexisting conditions in
separating individuals from a health insurance pool. Limiting
126. Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074 (1983) (per curiam); Manhart,
435 U.S. at 722-23.
127. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 701, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2000).
128. Id. § 1140; see Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278,281
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that employer violated ERISA by discharging employee ten months
before pension was due to vest, decreasing pension benefits by $60,000); Nemeth v. Clark
Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 910 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that in deciding which of two
plants to close, employer would have violated ERISA if difference in pension benefits had
been determining factor).
12492003]
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employers in this way is controversial. 129 Because the individual
and social value of the insurance derives directly from the pooling
itself, however, those problems and justifications are distinct from
those applying to the ADA. Although the ADA prohibits insurance
pooling uses of information about disabilities, 30 it also prohibits
employers from relying on individualized information in situations
where value does not derive principally from the pooling itself.
Justifications for these restrictions must go beyond the information
pooling arguments. Second, these types of preferences often arise in
the context of long-term relationships. Requiring employers to
refrain from firing employees shortly before vesting, for example,
must occur in a relationship that is long enough for vesting to be
imminent. Once again, limiting employers in that context is not
uncontroversial, but the arguments are distinct from those under
the ADA. Legal regulation of long-term relationships is directed at
problems that pervade those relationships, such as uncertainty and
asymmetrical performance.'' They are not the primary problems
to which the ADA is directed.
In summary, the ADA's hard preferences are not unique to
employment law, but the nature and context of the hard preferences
are distinguishable from other hard preference situations, such as
situations involving insurance pooling or long-term relationships.
This means that the justifications for the ADA's preferences
are likely to be different than those for preferences established
elsewhere.
129. For a sampling of the vast literature on the subject, see EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at
313-28; George J. Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe
Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 489 (1982); Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex
Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans:A Legal and DemographicAnalysis,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980); Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Discrimination: Manhart, 1979
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83.
130. See Interim Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 to Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer Provided Health
Insurance, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH N-915.002 (June 8, 1993)).
131. See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 26, at 302-06; Samuel Issacharoff & Erica
Worth, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780 (1997).
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E. Reasonable Accommodation and Affirmative Action
Proponents of the ADA often resist labeling the ADA's hard
preferences as affirmative action.132 Their reluctance seems to be a
political strategy given the controversy about affirmative action in
other areas. Nevertheless, it muddies thinking to deny what is a
central thrust of the ADA. To avoid a stingy interpretation, it would
be better to acknowledge that the ADA is designed to grant
preferences, even preferences that can be characterized aptly as
"hard preferences" or as "affirmative action," and to articulate the
argument in favor of those preferences.133
Viewing reasonable accommodation as affirmative action is an
important part of the heritage of the ADA. When the ADA was
enacted in 1990, reasonable accommodation was a concept used
under two different federal statutes. Reasonable accommodation
had been a part of Title VII since 1972 when it was inserted to
modify the prohibition on religious discrimination in employment. 3'
By 1990, the Supreme Court had already interpreted the require-
ment to impose only very minimal obligations on employers.'35
More importantly, reasonable accommodation was a concept used
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'6 The Rehabilitation Act does
not explicitly use the phrases "reasonable accommodation" or
"undue hardship." Rather the statute requires agencies and federal
contractors to engage in "affirmative action" to hire and advance
individuals with disabilities.' 7 In clarifying what affirmative action
132. See, e.g., Blanck, supra note 72, at 887-98; Paul Steven Miller, EEOC's Enforcement
of the ADA in the Second Circuit, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1577, 1581-83 (1998).
133. Important contributions to the affirmative action debate have adopted this strategy.
Rather than deny the existence or strength of affirmative action, they have acknowledged
it and defended it as appropriate. See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity,
and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 939 (1997); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997).
134. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103,
103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000)).
135. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (holding that an
employer meets his obligation by offering any reasonable accommodation even if the
employee would prefer another one); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84
(1977) (holding that employers are not obligated to make any accommodation which would
impose anything more than a de minimis cost).
136. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96
(2000)).
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (2000); see Affirmative Action Obligations of Contractors and
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meant, the Department of Labor introduced the terms "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship."" These terms then went
beyond the affirmative action regulations and were used by other
agencies and the courts to help delineate the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act's general nondiscrimination provision."i 9 Thus,
the concept of reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation
Act was initially conceived as an important component of the
Rehabilitation Act's affirmative action requirement and only later
inserted into the Act's conceptualization of the general non-
discrimination obligation.
When Congress inserted the reasonable accommodation language
into the ADA, it explicitly rejected the weak interpretation of the
concept under Title VII. "0 Instead, Congress explicitly accepted the
much more forceful interpretation of the concept under the
Rehabilitation Act.141 The Rehabilitation Act, then, not Title VII, is
the parent of the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.
Moreover, the Rehabilitation Act's version of the concept was
originally conceived as a mechanism for fulfilling that Act's explicit
affirmative action requirement. The lineal descent is clear; af-
firmative action is the grandparent of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement.
Subcontractors § 741.4(c), 39 F.R. 20,566, 20,568 (1974) (articulating accommodation and
hardship concepts, effective immediately but inviting comments); Affirmative Action
Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors for Handicapped Workers § 741.5(c), 40 F.R.
39,887, 39,889-90 (1975) (revising of accommodation and hardship concepts based on
comments).
138. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare also indicated its intention to
borrow concepts from the Department of Labor, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap,
41 F.R. 20,296, 20,300-01 (1976), and incorporated those concepts into its final rule,
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, § 84.12, 42 F.R. 22,676, 22,680 (1977).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
140. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350
(noting that the ADA contains a "significantly higher" reasonable accommodation standard
than Title VII).
141. Id. at 70-71 (1990) (suggesting that under the ADA, reasonable accommodation
"should be applied just as it is applied under [the Rehabilitation Act]"); see also ADA § 501,
42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2000) (noting that nothing in the ADA "shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under [the Rehabilitation Act]*). See generally
Alan D. Schuchman, Note, The Holy and the Handicapped:An Examination of the Different
Applications ofthe Reasonable.Accommodation Clauses in Title Wl and theADA, 73 IND. L.J.
745 (1998).
1252 [Vol. 44:1197
2003] WORKPLACE DISABILITIES 1253
The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accom-
modation to individuals with disabilities and ignore the costs of
accommodation in comparing employees. This hard preference was
not intended to be costless. 42 Although many and perhaps most
accommodations are cheap, 14 3 others are expensive.'" To deny this
thrust of the ADA risks a stingy interpretation of the Act which
would permit only low cost accommodations. Once again, the better
approach is to accept the hard preferences of the ADA and to admit
frankly that they are similar to, and perhaps even stronger than,
"affirmative action," and then to articulate clearly and forcefully
the justifications for the ADA's preferences. In the next section,
we discuss the scope of and justifications for the reasonable
accommodation requirement.
142. H.R. REP. NO. 101485, pt. 11, at 67-68 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
349-50 (emphasizing the significance of the expected burden under ADA by contrasting it
with the limited burden under Title VII for religious discrimination); H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. III, at 39-43 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462-65 (recognizing that
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are intended to impose a "significant, as
opposed to a de minimus or insignificant, obligation on ... employers").
143. See Frederick C. Collignon, The Role of Reasonable Accommodation in Employing
Disabled Persons in Private Industry, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 196 (Monroe
Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 1986) (finding in pre-ADA study of federal contractors that
51% of accommodations cost nothing, 30% cost less than $500, and only 8% cost more than
$2,000); Peter David Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act: A
Case Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 278, 278
(1996) (stating that between 1993 and 1996, 72% of Sears' accommodations cost nothing, 27%
cost less than $500, and only 1% cost more than $500; the average cost was $45); President's
Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Job Accommodation Network (JAN)
Reports (Oct.-Dec. 1994) (noting that two-thirds of accommodations cost less than $500).
These studies tend to underestimate accommodation costs because they focus on direct
outlays for accommodation and not on indirect costs, such as the personnel costs required to
structure the accommodation. Consequently, the studies represent a lower-bound estimate
of accommodation costs.
144. See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
district court's grant of the motion to dismiss and noting that providing a parking space
costing fifteen to twenty-six percent of monthly salary may be a reasonable accommodation);
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
providing a teaching assistant may be a reasonable accommodation); Nelson v. Thornburgh,
567 F. Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1188 (1985) (finding that providing a reader costing about one-quarter of annual salary
is a reasonable accommodation).
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IV. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: SCOPE AND JUSTIFICATION
Although the ADA requires employers to accommodate disabled
workers, the mandate is clearly bounded. Employers must not make
any and all accommodations, but only reasonable ones. Employers
must ignore costs and productivity differences up to the point of
reasonableness, but exactly where is that point? In this Part, we
describe and justify the scope and limits of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation mandate.
A. The ADA's Articulation of the Reasonable Accommodation
Model
The ADA's language itself is the place to begin exploring
reasonable accommodation. Unfortunately, the Act provides only a
general structure for analysis and gives little guidance to help
define its scope and limits. Despite this limitation, courts have
begun to articulate a vision of reasonable accommodation that
contains both procedural and substantive obligations.
The ADA makes reasonable accommodation central to three
important inquiries in disability cases. First, the statute prohibits
discrimination only against a "qualified individual with a
disability."145 A qualified individual, in turn, is defined as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job] ."146
Second, employers are required to make "reasonable accom-
modations to the known physical or mental limitations" of qualified
individuals with disabilities.147 Third, employers are not required
to make an accommodation if they can "demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business.""
Beyond indicating when the words "reasonable accommodation"
should be intoned in the analysis, however, the ADA is not very
helpful. The ADA's definition of "reasonable accommodation" says
that it "may include" making facilities accessible, restructuring
145. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
146. Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).




jobs, acquiring or modifying equipment, "and other similar accom-
modations. "1" The "may include" language undercuts most of the
guidance that might otherwise have been provided by the definition.
Reasonable accommodation may include the listed items, but then
again it may not. It depends, but we are not told on what. Moreover,
because reasonable accommodation "includes" the listed items, an
infinite array of other accommodations may also be reasonable.'
50
The ADA's definition of undue hardship is better, but it sheds
little light on the focus of this Article, the meaning of reasonable
accommodation. Undue hardship means an action "requiring
significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of factors
such as the nature and cost of the accommodation, the financial
resources of the employer, and the nature of the employer's
operations.15' Considered independently, this definition is better
than the one for reasonable accommodation for two reasons. First,
it provides a base: An undue hardship is an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense. The ADA's reasonable accom-
modation definition lacks such a base. Second, the definition
indicates that the list of relevant factors in the undue hardship
definition must be considered in every case. The definition says that
the factors to be considered "include" the factors, 152 in contrast to'
the reasonable accommodation definition which says that the
evaluation "may include" the factors listed there."a Like the
definition of reasonable accommodation, however, the definition of
undue hardship does not indicate that the listed factors are the only
factors to consider: An infinite array of other, unspecified factors
may also be relevant.
149. Id. § 12111(9).
150.
"Rleality" encompasses millions of facts, and unless we have a legal rule with
which to sift the material from the immaterial, we might as well examine the
facts through a kaleidoscope. Which facts matter, and why? A legal approach
calling on judges to examine all of the facts, and balance them, avoids
formulating a rule of decision.
Sec'y ofLaborv. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
152. Id. § 12111(10XB).
153. Id. § 12111(9).
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The ADA's treatment of undue hardship provides only very
modest help in refining the meaning of reasonable accommodation.
Consider the four possible relationships between reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship shown in Figure 4. In
quadrants A and D, both undue hardship and reasonable
accommodation cut in the same direction. Consequently, the results
in both quadrants are obvious and uninteresting. Analysis of
quadrants B and C, however, promises clues to the meaning of
reasonable accommodation. Consider quadrant B first: The
accommodation is reasonable, but imposes an undue hardship on
the employer. The ADA provides a clear answer to the ultimate
result in this quadrant: The employer need not make the
accommodation.15 The ADA also hints that the quadrant is not a
null set, that is, that cases actually exist which would fit into this
quadrant. The statute says employers must make a reasonable
accommodation unless the employer can demonstrate "that the
accommodation" would impose an undue hardship. 155 Presumably,
"the" accommodation is the reasonable one mentioned immediately
before, rather than some other one. Similarly, in quadrant C, the
statute provides a clear answer (the employer need not make
unreasonable accommodations, even if they do not impose an undue
hardship) and hints that this quadrant is not a null set either.













Quadrants B and C, then, provide modest help in thinking about
the meaning of reasonable accommodation. The statute implies that
the dividing line between accommodations that are reasonable and
unreasonable is not the same as the dividing line between
hardships that are acceptable (due?) and undue. Courts that have
held that undue hardship provides the upper boundary for
reasonable accommodations are wrong.!. But the statute provides
no guidance on the important question: What is the interaction
between the two concepts within those quadrants? In quadrant B,
that question is: How is it possible that a reasonable accom-
modation can impose an undue hardship? Would not an undue
hardship mean that the accommodation itself had to be
unreasonable? In quadrant C, the question is less paradoxical, but
perhaps even more crucial to the meaning of reasonable
accommodation: If an accommodation can be unreasonable even if
it does not impose an undue hardship, just how is one to evaluate
reasonableness? Not, presumably, based on the effect on the
employer because that is the undue hardship analysis. But if not
based on that, then based on what? The language of the ADA
provides no answers to these questions.
In sum, the ADA provides an overall framework for thinking
about reasonable accommodation, but only limited guidance on its
precise boundaries. The legislative history indicates that this is
precisely as Congress intended: Congress intended to leave the
details to the courts, as it did under Title VII. 57 In a promising
way, the courts have begun to assume the task of filling in the
details by delineating procedural and substantive aspects of the
accommodation duty.
156. See e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d
Cir. 1999) (stating that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship showings "merge"
into one inquiry); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are "the same thing").
157. See 136 CONG. REC. H2470, H2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. III, at 41-42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.'445, 464-65 ("By including a number
of factors [in the definitions of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship,] the
Committee intends to establish a flexible approach (through which determinations] ... must
be made on a case-by-case basis."); see also Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 144 (stating that Congress
made "very clear its desire to help some group of disadvantaged persons but [left] very
unclear how it expects its legislative solution to be implemented in the courtroom").
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B. Reasonable Accommodation as Procedure: The Interactive
Process
The developing concept of reasonable accommodation includes a
procedural component. As some courts have begun to recognize,
once triggered,158 reasonable accommodation requires employers to
engage in an "interactive process" to explore accommodation
possibilities.' 59 Employers are to analyze the job and its essential
functions, consult with the individual with a disability about the
precise job related limitations imposed by the disability and about
potential accommodations which would permit performance of the
job's essential functions, and consider the individual's preferences
in selecting and implementing an appropriate accommodation'60
The procedural component of reasonable accommodation finds
support in several of the economic justifications for the preferences
of the ADA. 16 1 Accommodation as procedure would further the
ADA's goal of eliminating adverse decisions because of employer
aversion. 162 As interaction increases, people are more likely to act
158. This Article focuses on the meaning of reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
It does not answer the related question of when the duty is triggered. In general, the duty
is triggered when the employer is notified of a disability, although many variations are
possible. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1998) ("Once a qualified individual with a disability has
requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable
effort to determine the appropriate accommodation."). For variations, see Browning v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the duty is not
triggered if it is clear that the employee could not perform the essential functions of the job);
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a duty may be triggered even if the employee, because of a mental disability, does not notify
the employer); White v. York Intl Corp., 45 F.3d 337, 362-63 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a duty is not triggered even though the employer was notified of the disability because it
would have been impossible for individual to perform essential functions of the job).
159. Although some courts have begun to recognize the requirement, the courts are split
on the issue. Compare Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1286, and Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc.,
93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing an "interactive process" requirement), with
Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997), and White, 45 F.3d at 357
(rejecting an "interactive process" requirement). See generally Alysa M. Barancik, Comment,
Determining Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA- Why Courts Should Require
Employers to Participate in an "Interactive Process," 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (1999).
160. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1998); Barnett, 157 F.3d at 756 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
161. The procedural component is also firmly based in the ADA's legislative history. H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 65-66 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 347-48
(reasonable accommodation is"best understood as a process"); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. III, at 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462.
162. See supra Part II.A.
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on the basis of the substance of the interaction, rather than on
thoughtless or subconscious aversion. 3 In this way, the forced
interaction of the procedural component would reduce adverse
decisions caused by employer aversion quite directly. Similarly,
forced interaction may contribute to the ADA's goal of changing the
preferences of employers.6 4 Complying with the ADA's procedural
obligations may inform employers of the strengths and potential of
individuals with disabilities and, consequently, reduce employer
aversion based on myth and stereotype. 16
5
Accommodation as procedure is supported even more strongly by
the ADA's goal of reducing disadvantage because of employer
ignorance about productivity. Employer ignorance about pro-
ductivity may well maximize profits for every individual employer
(because the costs of acquiring information exceed the expected
payoffs) and yet be inefficient for society overall. 166 The procedural
component of reasonable accommodation requires individual
employers to investigate the productivity of individuals with
disabilities and, hence, permits society to reap benefits that would
otherwise be lost: the productivity of individuals with disabilities
who are more productive than others and yet would not be hired
absent the ADA's procedural requirement.
In a similar way, the ADA's procedural obligation is supported by
the ADA's approach to statistical discrimination. As with employer
ignorance about productivity, it may be profit maximizing for every
individual employer to engage in statistical discrimination and yet
be inefficient for society overall. The procedural requirement breaks
this cycle and creates a proper set of incentives for individuals with
disabilities to invest in their own productivity. The labor market
works more efficiently with the requirement and, even more
importantly, it permits individuals with disabilities to assume a
163. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 63 (1998); cf
James S. Jackson, Racial Attitudes, Gender Roles & Athletic Identity in the Adjustment of
First-Year Black and White Intercollegiate Athletics, in A SPORTING CHANCE: THE ROLE OF
YOUTH SPORT IN URBAN SEMrINGS 159 (2002) (noting that participation in integrated high
school sports reduces prejudicial attitudes).
164. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
165. See Teresa L. Scheid, Compliance with the ADA and Employment of Those with
Mental Disabilities, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
146, 156-58 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000).
166. See supra Part II.B. for the foundation of this and the following paragpaphs.
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fuller role in the labor market and claim their rightful place as
important and productive members of the labor force.
Accommodation as procedure also provides important support for
its companion, substantive reasonable accommodation. Substantive
reasonable accommodation, discussed below, defines the reach of
the ADA's hard preferences, the extent to which employers must
hire individuals with disabilities even though they may be more
costly to employ or less productive than others." 7 The procedural
aspect of accommodation cannot answer the substantive question:
At what point do extra costs or lower productivity mean that
employers no longer have a duty to accommodate? The procedural
aspect can, however, ensure that employers have sufficient infor-
mation to evaluate their compliance with the ADA's substantive
obligations.
Beyond providing an information base, however, the procedural
component of reasonable accommodation is unconnected to the
substantive component. Figure 5 illustrates the possibilities.
Quadrants A and D again present obvious and unproblematic
situations of compliance and violation of the ADA, respectively.
Quadrants B and C both present situations in which the employer
has violated the ADA. In Quadrant B, the employer has fulfilled all
of its procedural obligations, but has failed to provide a required
substantive accommodation. For example, an employer might fully
consult with a blind applicant for employment and determine that
a reader was necessary to permit the applicant to perform the job,
and yet fail to provide the reader even though the accommodation
was reasonable and would not impose an undue hardship. The
employer's procedural fidelity does not insulate it from its
substantive obligation to make the presumptively reasonable
substantive accommodation. Similarly, in Quadrant C, the
employer has satisfied its substantive obligations, but failed
procedurally. For example, the employer may have made an
accommodation which satisfies its substantive obligation, even
though it did not engage in a proper interactive process or,
similarly, the employer may be able to prove that, even if it had
engaged in an interactive process, no reasonable substantive
accommodation was possible. Once again, however, the employer's
167. See supra Part I.B.2.
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compliance with one part of its obligations, in this case its
substantive obligation, does not insulate it from responsibility for
a violation of its other obligations, its procedural obligations.
Figure 5. Possible Combinations of the Procedural and







Some courts have refused to recognize a procedural component of
the reasonable accommodation obligation because of Quadrant C.
The Ninth Circuit has said a procedural component would produce
an "oddity" if employers who had provided an adequate substantive
accommodation could nevertheless be held liable for a procedural
shortcoming. 18 The Eleventh Circuit has said that it is unwilling
"to punish employers" for failing to comply with the procedural
obligation in situations where no substantive accommodation is
possible.189 The courts have not seemed to recognize that these are
general consequences of procedural obligations, not ones unique to
the ADA. Constitutional due process, for example, can produce
the same "oddities" and "punishments," as can the procedural
requirements of fiduciary obligation in pension law.1 70 One point
168. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 196 F.8d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc on
other grounds, 201 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 2000).
169. Willis v. Conopco, Inc. 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997).
170. The test of prudence in modem pension law is largely procedural. See, e.g., Donovan
v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that courts should focus on the
fiduciary's investigation of an investment "rather than on an evaluation of the merits alone");
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here is that the courts are justified in rejecting the procedural
aspects of the ADA on these grounds only if they are also willing to
reject on the same grounds important aspects of constitutional due
process, the law of fiduciary duty, and other areas of the law. The
broader point is that the procedural aspect of the accommodation
duty is not a new and unique obligation formulated for the ADA.
Instead, it fits within a strong tradition of recognizing a procedural
obligation as an important component of a set of obligations
designed to protect important interests. Under the ADA, one would
expect to see few cases fitting within Quadrant C, in part because
the damages would be limited.17 But neither that, nor perceived
oddities or punishments, undermine the importance and centrality
of procedural obligation to the ADA's general duty of reasonable
accommodation.
Other courts have recognized the ADA's procedural obligation,
but interpreted it to impose roughly equivalent consultative
obligations on both employers and individuals with disabilities.
Courts have sanctioned employers who have failed to engage in an
interactive process and individuals with disabilities who have failed
to engage properly. 172 The equivalence suggested by the phrase
trustees 'employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment").
See generally BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT
MAN RULE 110 (1986) ("[Plrudence is a test of conduct and not performance [and] the most
promising vehicle for accomplishing that shift is a paradigm of prudence based above all on
process."); SUSAN P. SEROTA, ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 372 (Susan P. Serota et al. eds., 1995)
(noting that courts have stated the test of prudence "largely in procedural terms").
This conceptualization of prudence produces exactly the same type of "oddities" feared by
the Ninth Circuit. In one of the leading cases, for example, the court found that fiduciaries
violated their fiduciary duties primarily because of procedural shortcomings, yet there were
no damages because the investments outperformed their benchmarks. Donovan v. Bierwirth,
680 F.2d 263,271-74 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding fiduciary violations); Ford v. Bierwirth, 636 F.
Supp. 540, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding no damages because of the investments'
performance).
171. In the Ninth Circuit's situation, damages would be limited because the employer has
provided a legally sufficient substantive accommodation, so the only damages would be any
limited ones available for failure to comply with the ADA's procedural requirement.
Similarly, in the Eleventh Circuit's situation, damages would be limited because the
employer can demonstrate that, even if proper procedures had been followed, no reasonable
substantive accommodation would have been possible. Once again, the only damages
available would be the limited ones caused by the procedural failure alone. For a discussion,
see Steven L. Willborn, A Nested Model of Disability Discrimination (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
172. See supra notes 54-55, 65 and accompanying text; Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens &
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"interactive process," however, is improper. The employer's
obligation is a part of the reasonable accommodation duty, which
is imposed only on employers and not on individuals with
disabilities.173 Any obligations of individuals with disabilities must
be based on other types of legal obligation, such as waiver or
estoppel, with much higher thresholds before legal consequences
can attach. Thus, analysis of the interactive process should focus on
the employer's obligations. Those obligations maybe affected by the
reactions of the individual with disability, but that does not justify
prejudice against the individual based on standards significantly
lower than those for waiver and estoppel. The individual's reactions
can be used to calibrate the reasonableness of the process followed
by the employer; as an individual with a disability becomes
progressively less able or willing to participate in the process, the
employer's procedural obligations should diminish. The focus,
however, should always be on the nature and extent of the
employer's obligation; individuals with disabilities have no
obligations to engage in the interactive process, other than the
minimal ones of avoiding waiver or estoppel.
C. Substantive Reasonable Accommodation: Defining
Reasonableness
The ADA requires more than procedure. It also imposes
substantive obligations. After the procedures are completed,
employers must provide accommodations and they must ignore the
contributions of nonessential functions to productivity. The ADA's
substantive obligations have an impact when they require
employers to hire an individual with a disability even though they
reasonably predict, after fulfilling procedural obligations, that the
individual will cost more to employ or be less productive than
another candidate. These are the ADA's hard preferences, which
Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1999); Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prod., Inc.,
165 F.3d 1212, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1999); D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 151-52
(2d Cir. 1998); see also Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that "both parties bear responsibility" for engaging in the interactive process);
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 ("[1]t is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform
the employer that an accommodation is needed.").
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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are an integral and undeniable part of the structure of the ADA.
Defining their scope is the central problem of the Act, and a very
difficult one."17 When must the extra cost of an accommodation be
ignored? And when does it become significant enough to permit an
employer to rely on it in making an adverse employment decision?
When does a job function contribute so little to productivity that it
is nonessential and must be ignored? And when does it contribute
enough to permit the employer to base employment decisions on a
candidate's ability to perform it? Courts and commentators have
generally emphasized that these issues are very fact specific and
that decision makers should be guided by "common sense." 75 That
is to say, they have not provided much guidance at all.17
The ADA itself provides a promising, if cryptic, answer to this
central problem: Reasonableness. Employers must provide
(almost)' all reasonable accommodations, but need not provide any
unreasonable ones. Reasonableness is a ubiquitous and resonant
word in American law,178 and yet the courts and commentators in
ADA cases have treated it, curiously, as a free-standing and
virtually standardless modifier.'79 That is a mistake. The reach of
174. Professors Karlan and Rutherglen have pointed out that the problem is difficult
because its resolution depends on the interaction of four factors which can vary significantly
from case to case: the individual's particular disability, the essential functions of the job, the
possible accommodations that would enable the individual to do the job, and the burden the
accommodations would impose on the employer. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 13.
175. See, e.g., Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div., 201 F.3d 894, 899-900 (7th Cir. 2000);
Barber v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 130 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Borkowski v. Valley
Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Senator Tom Harkin, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Four Years Later- Commentary on Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV.
935, 937 (1994) (commenting that the ADA *creates flexible, common sense standards
designed to avoid undue hardship and to promote reasonable solutions").
176. See Lance Liebman, Too Much Information Predictions of Employee Disease and the
Fringe Benefit System, 1988 U. CH. LEGAL F. 57, 81 (recognizing the lack of guidance and
calling on the legal community to "bring ourselves to quantify or otherwise bound what we
mean by reasonable accommodation").
177. The exception, of course, is that employers need not provide even reasonable
accommodations if they impose an undue hardship. See supra Part IV.
178. Professor Fletcher, for example, has noted that the words "reasonable" and
"reasonably" modify more than 100 different words in the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Model Penal Code, and the Restatements. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable,
98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949 n.1 (1985). That, of course, is merely the tip of the proverbial
iceberg.
179. Occasionally, a court or commentator will briefly allude to the fuller resonance of the
term "reasonableness," but never in any depth and not yet in the ways suggested in this
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the ADA's accommodation duty can be better defined by calling on
a deeper and more sophisticated conception of reasonableness.
Reasonableness as used in American law, especially tort law,
carries with it a cluster of concepts which could help to refine the
meaning of reasonable accommodation. First, reasonableness is a
standard, not a rule. Compared to rules, standards give less ex ante
guidance to parties, but avoid over- and under-inclusiveness
problems.180 Standards contemplate a wide-ranging search for
factors relevant to the determination at issue,'81 while rules
typically focus on one or a few factors. Several attempts have been
made to make the ADA's accommodation requirement more rule-
like, for example by providing that only accommodations costing
less than $500 need be made. 182 But the ADA's task of matching the
myriad of individuals with varying disabilities with the most
appropriate workplaces requires examination of a wide range of
factors. These factors include cost as a critical component, but also
'include the benefit to the individual with a disability, the demands
of the job, the structure of the workplace, and a host of other
factors. The search for relevant factors should not be confined to the
interests of the individual with a disability, the cost of the
Article. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995)
(alluding to tort law, but rejecting the analogy); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 32
(noticing the torts analogy, but rejecting it because the ADA requires more than efficiency).
180. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuKE L.J. 557 (1992).
181. Fletcher, supra note 178, at 951-54.
182. See VA. CODEANN. § 51.5-41(C) (2) (Michie 2002) (accommodations costing more than
$500 are presumed to impose an undue hardship on employers with fewer than fifty
employees); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(6) (d) (1995) (accommodations need not be
made if they cost more than five percent of employee's annual salary); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
168A-3(10(a) (6) (2001) (same); cf Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. Dole,
676 F. Supp. 635, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (striking down a Department of Transportation
regulation limiting the amount of money a public transit operator must spend to provide
access to the disabled to three percent of its budget); Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright
Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes 'Undue' Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 453-54 (1995) (suggesting a precise
quantitative limit on the extent of accommodation based on the employer's net working
capital, net profit, and size of labor force); Note, Employment Discrimination Against the
Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1013 (1984) (suggesting a "maximum statutory level for accommodation
costs (of) X percent of the employee's annual salary").
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accommodation, the burden on the employer, the reactions of
co-employees or customers, or, indeed, to any defined set of
considerations. Instead, the concept of reasonableness entails
recognition that a wide range of interests are potentially at stake
and that those interests may vary from case to case.' Drawing on
this element of reasonableness provides the proper context for ADA
decision making. The decision maker should not focus unduly on
any one set of interests, such as employer costs or the rights of
individuals with disabilities, but instead should engage in a full
and wide-ranging consideration of multiple, complex, and often
conflicting interests.
Over time, one would hope that certain patterns will develop in
the cases and that the reasonableness standard will become
somewhat predictable or rule-like. Courts could hold, as a matter
of law, that one type of accommodation is reasonable in nearly every
situation, or that another type is unreasonable. As examples in this
direction, Judge Posner has held as a matter of law that working at
home would be a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA
only in "very extraordinary" cases,1 ' and the Supreme Court has
held that seniority almost always trumps reasonable accom-
modation claims.185 In doing so, these courts fulfill the vision of
Justice Holmes, who predicted that as courts gain experience in a
particular area the amorphous reasonableness standard would give
way to specific rules. 8' Whether reasonableness standards evolve
in this way is debatable. Justice Holmes' most infamous torts rule
as a judge was his requirement that cars "stop, look, and listen" at
all railroad crossings."' The rule was sufficiently clear but called
for unreasonable behavior in many situations. Justice Cardozo
gutted the rule a few years later, emphasizing "the need for caution
183. The interests are likely to vary across cases because of the extreme heterogeneity
both of individuals with disabilities and ofworkplaces. See Kaplow, supra note 180, at 563-64
(arguing that heterogeneity supports the use of a standard rather than a rule).
184. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 545.
185. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1519 (2002).
186. O.W. HOLMES,JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881) ([T]he featureless generality, that
the defendant was bound to use such care as a prudent man would do under the
circumstances, ought to be continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to
use this or that precaution under these or those circumstances.").
187. Bait. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927).
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in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law."'
The current draft of the Third Restatement follows Cardozo's logic,
suggesting that patterns that seem to recur and to call for a
consistent rule often break down on closer inspection. 189 Thus, given
the diversity of disabilities and of workplaces in this country, one
should not expect much of a movement towards rules.
A second concept of reasonableness is its strong notion of duty.90
People are reasonable when they fulfill their duty of care towards
others, and unreasonable when they do not. The ADA establishes
an analogous duty of extra care towards individuals with
disabilities. Both of these duties-tort law's general duty of care
and the ADA's more specific duty of extra care-are difficult to
specify in practice because of the large variety of circumstances in
which they can arise. Thus, although the mere existence of a duty
does not specify its extent, tort law's nuanced solutions to the
problem of defining the scope of the duty of care can help in
addressing the closely analogous problem under the ADA.191
Third, and most importantly, reasonableness implies a per-
spective and methodology for engaging in this wide-ranging inquiry
to determine the scope of duty: One must act as a reasonable person
would in similar circumstances. The reasonable person (RP) is an
attractive construct in disability law for the same reasons tort law
was attracted to it. RP is objective. RP directs the decision maker's
188. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934).
189. RESTATEMENT(TH!RD)OFTORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 5, cmt. d (Discussion Draft,
1999) ("[IWhat looks at first to be a constant or recurring issue of conduct in which many
parties engage may reveal on closer inspection many variables that can best be considered
on a case-by-case basis.").
190. Duty has been a controversial subject in torts scholarship, but it remains an
important concept in the courts and in treatises. For an excellent review of the controversy,
see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1733 (1998) (arguing that the academic critique of duty is unconvincing and that the
concept should be reinvigorated in tort law). See also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996) (developing a social
contract conception of the duty of care). Regardless of its status in tort law, however, it is
valuable here for the contribution it can make in disability law.
191. Recent scholarship on duty in tort law affirms the analogy between the two types of
duty. Professors Goldberg and Zipursky have identified a conception of duty that emphasizes
the relationship-sensitive and noninstrumental nature of tort duty. Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 190, at 1825-42. Similarly, duty under the ADA is strongly relationship-sensitive
(responsive to the particular circumstances of both the individual with a disability and of the
employer) and contains significant noninstrumental elements.
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attention away from the passions of the stakeholders to the dispute,
which are often strong, conflicting, and incommensurable, and
toward a neutral perspective. RP balances interests as an average
member of the community would. When RP speaks, community
standards are set. An individual case is no longer only about the
particular circumstances of that case, which are infinitely variable,
but also about the standard of conduct which the community
demands. The essence of the reasonableness command is that the
actor treat the interests of others as seriously as his own. The costs
and benefits of all people in the community should be valued
equally.
Although tort law's reasonable person framework helps frame the
scope of the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement, the
real question is how far to push it. We proceed in two steps. We
begin by exploring how the narrow, cost-benefit approach (often
called the BPL analysis) would apply to the ADA. We then expand
the approach by considering how an avoiding dependency, external
benefits analysis would be added to the mix.
1. BPL Analysis
In tort law, an important strain of scholarship envisions the
reasonable person as one who takes precautions if and only if the
burden (B) of doing so is less than the cost of accidents that would
occur if the precautions were not taken (L), discounted by the
probability (P) of an accident occurring."' A person who does not
take precautions when B<P*L is unreasonable and therefore will be
found negligent and liable for the resulting accidents. But a person
is reasonable in failing to take an overly costly precaution (when
B>P*L) and will not be held liable even when an accident occurs
from the failure to take the precaution. For example, suppose a
precaution would burden the actor $200 and reduce the victim's
expected accident costs by $1000. Tort law will declare the actor
who failed to take these precautions to be negligent. But if the
precaution burden is $2000 and the expected accident reduction
192. See, e.g., ROBERTCOOTER&THOMAS ULEN,LAWANDECONOMICS 281-83 (2d ed. 1997);
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 43 (1972). For Judge
Learned Hand's seminal judicial statement of the approach, see United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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$1000, the failure to take the precaution is reasonable. Under this
approach, negligence law forces the actor to weigh. the costs and
benefits of his actions, including the harm he inflicts on others. By
doing so, tort law induces the actor to take all cost-justified safety
precautions, even when they benefit strangers. If the costs outweigh
the benefits, however, the actor injures without legal liability, and
the victim bears the costs of these accidents not worth preventing.
How would the BPL approach apply to reasonable accom-
modation of the disabled? The reviewing court would compare the
burden of the accommodation to the employer (B) against the gains
to the disabled worker (L), discounted by the likelihood of the
accommodation achieving its goals (P). Thus, if the accommodation
would cost the employer $200 and have an eighty percent chance of
benefitting the person with a disability by $1000, the BPL analogy
would label the accommodation reasonable and require it. On the
other hand, if the accommodation would cost the employer $2000
and have an expected benefit of $800, the accommodation is
unreasonable and need not be undertaken.
One problem is that the "P" part of the BPL analogy is imperfect,
because one rarely thinks of an accommodation as having a risk of
not working. This is only a minor problem, however. The torts BPL
approach can be easily generalized to a cost-benefit approach that
compares the burden of the accommodation to the gains to the
disabled worker. Uncertainty of either cost or benefit can be put
into the balance when appropriate.
A larger problem is finding a common metric to compare burdens
and gains. The costs to the employer are largely financial, and
usually can be readily quantified. An easy case would be the cost of
constructing a ramp for a wheelchair. But one must also consider
indirect burdens and benefits, which are trickier to quantify. For
example, the ramp may slow deliveries into the building, leading to
reduced sales. Or it may provide access to a new class of customers
who need the ramp. Even here, however, conceptually the ultimate
measure of burden is the net reduction of profits, both direct and
indirect, of making the accommodation.
Quantifying the gains to the worker is harder. Much of the gain,
of course, is financial. If the accommodation allows the disabled
worker to obtain a job that pays $30,000, whereas without the
accommodation the highest paying job he could secure pays
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$20,000, the worker gains $10,000. Comparing worker financial
gains to employer burdens is straightforward enough. The less
tangible gains to the workers arising from a greater sense of worth,
productivity, and self-fulfillment that a good job can bring are more
difficult to quantify. How should these be measured? The normal
economic approach is to ask (at least conceptually) how much the
individual would be willing to pay for the gains of the better job, or
to ask how little the individual with the better job would accept to
agree to take the lesserjob (which may include unemployment). The
willingness-to-pay answer may differ significantly from willingness-
to-accept, and when it does the cost-benefit analysis can be
ambiguous.'93 But one should not demand of the BPL analysis an
exactness of figures. For example, Judge Posner, when discussing
the reasonable person analogy to disability law in the well-known
Vande Zande case, 9 " emphasized that the approach only calls for
rough comparisons, not exact dollars. Judge Posner wrote:
It would not follow [from employing the tort reasonable person
analogy] that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace to
enable a disabled person to work would always have to be
quantified, or even that an accommodation would have to be
deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however
slightly. But, at the very least, the cost could not be
disproportionate to the benefit.... [An employer] would not be
required to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a
trivial improvement in the life of a disabled employee.195
Most problematic for the torts analogy is that the torts vision of
controlling externalities works best when the actor and victim are
strangers who are unable to bargain over the amount of safety the
actor should provide. The traffic accident is the paradigmatic tort
example of accidents between strangers. Of course, much of tort law
involves claims between persons in a contractual relationship, the
most prominent examples being products liability and medical
193. For a recent discussion of whether to employ willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-
accept in the context of conducting a cost-benefit analysis for an environmental project, see
Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Linda J. Graham, The Role of Rights in Benefit Cost Methodology:
The Example of Salmon and Hydroelectric Dams, 74 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1999).
194. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
195. Id. at 542-43.
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malpractice. Economic scholars have long puzzled over the
appropriate role of tort law in these contractual settings. 196 The
employer-employee relationship is likewise contractual, compli-
cating the torts analogy.
Because employers and workers are not strangers unable to
bargain, the puzzle is why a mandatory or coercive disability law is
needed at all. If the goal of the BPL interpretation of the ADA is to
force employers to adopt all cost-effective accommodations that
benefit the worker more than they cost the employers, employers
should be willing to do this without legal compulsion. All that is
needed is that the worker be willing to pay for the accommodation,
which, by definition, she is willing to do if the accommodation is
reasonable in BPL terms. For example, if the employer's cost of
accommodation is $500 and the gain to the disabled worker is
$5000, measured by the worker's willingness-to-pay or willingness-
to-accept, both the employer and the worker benefit by making the
accommodation and reducing the disabled worker's wage by any
amount between $500 and $5000. The ADA is not needed for the
parties to reach this agreement, because it benefits both sides.
One answer to this puzzle could be that workers cannot accept
lower wages. The ADA is a response to other rigidities in the labor
market which make it illegal or impractical for the employee to
accept lower wages. For example, minimum wage laws make it
impossible for some disabled workers to accept lower wages. So
could an interpretation of the ADA which made wage differences
between disabled and nondisabled workers illegal. Equally
important are the norms prevalent in many industries preventing
wage differences for workers in the same job category. If this is the
case, it may be that removing the barriers to more flexible wages is
a better policy response to the problem than a mandatory
accommodation requirement.
In any event, the inflexible wage answer cannot cover all
situations. The BPL analysis seems to be missing something.
196. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 40.
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2. Avoiding-Dependence Analysis
One of the presumed major gains from the ADA is that disabled
persons will become productive members of the workforce, reducing
the need for costly social welfare programs. As economists estimate
that the marginal excess burden of raising additional tax revenue
is as high as fifty-six percent, 97 raising taxes to fund social welfare
programs can be incredibly wasteful if the same goals can be
accomplished through other means. 9 ' Indeed, the preamble to the
Americans with Disabilities Act emphasizes that "unfair and
unnecessary discrimination [against] people with disabilities ...
costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity." 99
When an employer accommodates a disabled person, under this
vision, not only do the employer and disabled person benefit, but
the government fisc is preserved as well. Should these gains count
in the reasonable accommodation calculus? The argument that
these gains should count is that the ADA simply forces employers
to recognize a positive externality of their decision to accommodate.
Not only does the worker gain, but society gains as well.
Consider the following example. Suppose an accommodation
would cost $2000 per year. The disabled person currently receives
197. Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computation of the Marginal Welfare
Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 136 (1985) ("[M]arginal welfare
costs from raising existing distorting taxes in the United States ... range [from] 17 to 56
[percent]."); see also Edgar Browning, On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 11 (1987).
198. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 177 (1989).
199. ADA § 2(a) (9), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (9) (2000). Savings in welfare costs were also a
recurrent theme during congressional debates on the ADA. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Durenberger) (stating that the U.S. government cannot afford to pay
welfare benefits to people who can and want to work); 136 CONG. REC. 17,294 (1990)
(statement of Rep. Oberstar) (contending that society pays the costs when the disabled are
not permitted to work and noting that the ADA will produce three dollars in benefits for
every one dollar expended); 136 CONG. REC. 11,455 (1990) (statement of Rep. Wolpe)
(suggesting that forced dependency of individuals with disabilities has resulted in escalating
economic burdens for government of about $300 billion annually); 136 CONG. REC. 11,447
(1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (arguing that ADA will permit individuals with
disabilities to be taxpayers and help reduce federal deficit, instead of being dependent on
other taxpayers); 135 CONG. REc. 19,808 (1989) (statement ofSen. Kennedy) (remarking that
welfare costs for disabled persons were $169 billion and suggesting that the ADA will permit
them to work and pay taxes rather than receive benefits).
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Social Security disability benefits of $10,000 per year.200 After the
accommodation, -the worker could increase employer revenues by
$11,000 per year. Is it reasonable to incur this accommodation? In
the absence of legal compulsion, a profit maximizing employer will
not make the accommodation. The worker presumably would not
accept wages of less than $10,000, leaving only $1000 of gross
profit from the hire, which is not enough for the employer to cover
the accommodation costs. Overall, however, society prefers the
accommodation. Assuming a marginal excess burden of thirty
percent in the United States, society saves $3000 in losses, because
the government no longer needs to raise $10,000 in taxes to support
our hypothetical employee. Incurring a $2000 accommodation
expense so the disabled person can produce $11,000 is cheaper than
incurring a $3000 tax distortion loss whereby the worker produces
nothing.
It is important to remember that the $2000 cost in this example
is per year. These costs are easy to evaluate for some accom-
modations, such as readers for the blind. When evaluating a one-
time, fixed-cost accommodation, such as a wheelchair ramp,
however, an employer must divide its cost by the number of years
the employee is expected to work. In addition, some fixed-cost
accommodations may benefit other disabled workers, thus saving
society even more. Although this introduces more uncertainty into
the calculations, the basic point is that society would like the
employer in our example to spend considerably more than $2000 if
the accommodation benefits several individuals with disabilities for
several years.
Now let us use this general framework, but permit the cost of the
required accommodation to vary. This will enable us to think about
the possible scope of "reasonable" accommodations. At one level, the
required accommodations might fall into a range which would
permit a wage meeting two conditions: (1) the employee would be
willing to work at that wage, and (2) the employer could profit from
it. In our example, the employee would be willing to work for any
200. In December 2000, the average monthly SSI/SSDI benefit was $786.40, which is
equivalent to $9,436.80 per year. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILIrY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2000 tbl. 9,
available at http://www.esa.gov/statistica/di-aar/2000/sectlb.html#t9 (last visited Feb. 6,
2003).
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amount in excess of $10,000 assuming, unrealistically, that the
psychic costs of working over leisure exactly balance the psychic
gains from productive work. The employer will still obtain a profit
at any wage below $11,000. Therefore any accommodation costing
under $1000 would fall into this range.
Accommodations in this range would clearly be "reasonable." But
does the ADA have any effect in this situation? Without more, the
employer would be willing to hire this individual even without the
ADA. Three factors indicate, despite this, the ADA may have some
effect. First, without the ADA, employers may not fully consider
individuals with disabilities. The Act requires employers to take a
close look at individuals with disabilities and may cause employers
to realize that happy outcomes like this are possible, when they
would not otherwise. Second, this analysis ignores the possibility
that employers are constrained in the number of workers they can
hire. If an employer can hire only one worker, for example, and
another, nondisabled employee were present who would also be
willing to work for $10,001, the employer would prefer her to our
individual with a disability who is willing to work for $10,001, but
who, however, requires an accommodation costing more than $1.
The ADA, however, requires employers to ignore the costs of
accommodation in considering individuals with disabilities. °1
Therefore, the ADA requires the employer to treat these two
employees equally; without the ADA, the employer would favor
the nondisabled applicant. Finally, the ADA prohibits wage
discrimination. If nondisabled employees were only willing to work
at this job for $11,000, the employer would be required to pay the
individual with a disability $11,000, too. The $10,000 figure is
useful for thinking about the scope of the accommodation duty and
the willingness of the individual with a disability to work, but it has
little relation to the market wage for the job. To the extent the
market wage for the job is higher, the employer would have to pay
the individual with a disability that wage and pay for the costs of
accommodation.0 2
201. See supra Part lII.A.
202. We consider in the next few paragraphs whether this might require the employer to




Now let us consider another range of possible accommodation
costs. In our example, society would benefit even if accommodation
costs were as high as $2999. Without accommodation, the
government must raise $10,000 in taxes to pay the disability
benefits. The net is -$3000, assuming a marginal excess burden of
thirty percent. With an accommodation of $2999, the cost to provide
employment to the individual with a disability might be $11,000 in
wages plus an amount up to $2999 in accommodation costs (for a
total of $13,999), but society receives $11,000 of productivity in
return. The net is "only" -$2999, which is better than the no-
accommodation net. Viewed in this way, the ceiling on "reasonable"
accommodations would be the welfare loss that society incurs by
raising taxes to pay disability benefits. Thus, this is one instance
where it is better to impose mandates on employers than to provide
government benefits. Further, the costs of mandates and
government benefits come out of different pockets.2 3
Reasonable accommodation requirements then can be seen as
forcing the employer to internalize the dependency costs that
society would otherwise feel compelled to provide. This implies both
an obligation at the lower end of accommodation costs and a ceiling
on the amount of the substantive accommodation required.
Calling on tort law to calibrate the reach of reasonable
accommodation is obviously not without problems. Being problem
free, however, is not the appropriate yardstick. Instead, the
yardstick should be: How does the avoiding-dependence approach
compare with the current analysis that rejects both substantive
standards themselves and any analytical framework for setting
them and emphasizes instead case-by-case decisions and the
exercise of common sense? The current approach has led to many
complaints that judges and juries require much too little of
employers. One reason for that may be the standardless approach
to deciding the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation and
judicial fears that, because there are no apparent limits to the duty,
any generosity will result in a slippery slope towards onerous
burdens. An approach to the accommodation duty which relies on
traditional tort notions and which incorporates a restraint on the
203. See generally Summers, supra note 198, at 177 (arguing that mandated benefits are
similar to publicly financed programs, but offer employers and employees greater choice).
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scope of the duty may make the courts more willing to expand the
duty of reasonable accommodation. Ironically, individuals with
disabilities may be treated better under an approach to reasonable
accommodation which contains explicit limitations than they are
under an approach with no limits. Even if that is not true, the
approach provides standards and evidentiary possibilities for
shaping the contours of the duty and, consequently, for challenging
stingy exercises of discretion. Under the current, virtually
standardless approach, courts and juries are given virtually free
rein. In sum, in comparison with the current standardless approach
to reasonable accommodation, the tort-based external benefits
approach stands up quite well.
D. Paying for Accommodations: Expanding the Reach of the ADA
Substantive reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
establish the limits of employer responsibility under the ADA. The
employer must make accommodations up to the point of
reasonableness (or, if lower, up to the point of undue hardship).0 4
An employer does not need to provide any accommodation to an
individual with a disability who requires greater than reasonable
accommodations to perform the essential functions of a job. If an
extra-reasonable accommodation is required, an employer, is free to
take all the costs of accommodation into account in making
employment decisions and to reject the individual because of
them. 20
5
204. Undue hardship can have one of three possible relationships with reasonable
accommodation. It can be higher, lower, or the same. Undue hardship is relevant in a case
only if its threshold is lower than the threshold of reasonable accommodation. In the rest of
this section, we assume that the level of reasonable accommodation is lower than the level
of undue hardship. This permits us to refer only to reasonable accommodation rather than
to both concepts in our discussion. We do this only for ease of explication; the actual
threshold is the lower of reasonable accommodation or undue hardship.
205. The razor's edge nature of the current view of reasonable accommodation is
problematic. If the accommodation required is substantial, but reasonable by a very close
margin, the employer must ignore the cost of accommodation in making a decision. On the
other hand, if the accommodation is greater by only a very tiny amount, but enough to cross
the razor's edge of reasonableness, the employer can consider all of the costs of
accommodation in making an employment decision, including the majority of the costs that
are reasonable.
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This feature of the ADA establishes a large class of individuals
with disabilities who are not protected by the Act: individuals
whose disabilities prevent them from performing the essential
functions of a job without extra-reasonable accommodations.2"6
Given the diversity of both disabilities and jobs, however, it is likely
that even individuals who are unprotected with respect to some jobs
because the costs of accommodation are too high would remain
under the umbrella of the Act with respect to other jobs. An
individual with a severe mobility limitation, for example, may be
unprotected when she applies for a construction job and yet fully
protected when she applies for a store manager position.
This feature of the Act may cause some individuals with
disabilities to settle for less desirable jobs which require lesser
accommodations. Choosing to pursue a desirable job with high
accommodation costs presents the risk that the individual will fall
on the wrong side of the reasonableness divide and be unprotected
by the Act. Many individuals with disabilities may settle for the
safer choice of a less desirable job with lower accommodation
costs that are quite clearly reasonable.2 ' This phenomenon is
206. This lack of protection is not excused by the existence of other programs which may
provide assistance to individuals requiring extra-reasonable accommodations, such as Social
Security Disability Insurance, which provides benefits to disabled workers, 42 U.S.C. § 423
(2000), and Supplemental Security Income, which provides benefits to the disabled poor. Id.
§§ 1381-1383. The ADA and these other disability benefit programs do not protect two wholly
separate classes of individuals. Instead, some individuals eligible for disability benefits from
the federal programs may also deserve protection under the ADA. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.
Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805 (1999). For an insightful discussion, see Matthew Diller,
Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans With Disabilities Act and
Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998).
207. We do not imply here that there is always a correlation between desirable jobs and
high accommodation costs. In many instances, the most highly desirable jobs may require
the least costly accommodations. When that occurs, obviously, the individual with a disability
will choose to pursue the highly desirable/low accommodation cost job. The point here is only
that when a choice exists between a desirable job with high costs and a less desirable job with
lower costs, the possibility that the Act may provide no protection if the individual pursues
the desirable job encourages individuals with disabilities to make the safe choice.
Ifthis occurs, it supports an alternative interpretation of the evidence that accommodation
costs are low. It would mean that the studies tell us little about the true cost of
accommodating disabilities or the scope of the accommodation duty. The studies may reflect
(1) requests for full accommodations, which are inexpensive, or (2) requests for less generous
accommodations than the law requires. It is impossible to distinguish definitively between
these two alternatives from the studies themselves. Nevertheless, the low cost of
accommodations in the studies at least suggests that individuals with disabilities are
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problematic because it tends to sort individuals with disabilities
into jobs which require low accommodation costs, rather than into
jobs which would best utilize the individual's knowledge and skills.
Combined with the similar incentive employers have to select
individuals with low accommodation costs, 28 this threatens the
ADA's goal of providing individuals with disabilities with a full and
fair opportunity in the labor market. Full accommodation would
sort individuals with disabilities into better jobs.
The ADA should be interpreted to encourage individuals with
disabilities to seek the best jobs suitable for them with full or even
more-than-full accommodation. This could be accomplished by a
rule which permitted individuals with disabilities to pay for some
of their own accommodation costs. 2 9 Employers are required by the
ADA to pay for all reasonable accommodations. 210 But to the extent
accommodations necessary to enable the individual to perform the
essential functions of the job exceed that level, the individual
requesting less than would be required to place them in their most desirable job.
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. This interpretation of the Act finds direct support in the legislative history of the
AD&
[Tihe Committee wishes to make it clear that even if there is a determination
that a particular reasonable accommodation will result in an undue hardship,
the employer must pay for the portion of the accommodation that would not
cause an undue hardship if, for example, the applicant or employee pays for the
remainder of the cost of the accommodation.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. II, at 69 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,352; see also
id. at 68, 70; 135 CONG. REC. 19,834 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (suggesting that an
employee may provide accommodations herself to avoid undue hardship).
Curiously, despite this support in the legislative history, the EEOC's regulations only
vaguely hint at the possibility that individuals with disabilities may pay for part of the cost
of their own accommodations. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(pX2Xi) (2002) (noting that undue
hardship should be determined based on the "net cost of the accommodation ... taking into
consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding")
(emphasis added). A few commentators have alluded to the possibility. See G. William
Davenport, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Appraisal of the Major Employment-
Related Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 ALA. L. REv. 307, 326 (1992) (stating that
employers must permit an individual with a disability to pay for the undue hardship portion
of accommodation cost, but close judicial scrutiny should be expected); Liebman, supra note
176, at 60-62 (describing how laws are restricting employer hiring decisions when dealing
with the disabled).
210. This requirement would still apply under the proposed rule. That is, an employer
would violate the Act if it required an individual with a disability to pay for any of the
reasonable portion of accommodations. The proposal permits individuals to pay only for
portions of the accommodation cost which are extra-reasonable.
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herself should be permitted to pay for the extra accommodations.21'
This rule would extend the scope of the ADA's protections to
individuals who would otherwise be unprotected and, even within
the currently protected class, it would encourage individuals with
disabilities to seek the full set of accommodations to which they are
entitled.
The rule would extend the scope of the ADA by providing
protection for people who require extra-reasonable accommodations
to perform a job. As indicated above, currently individuals with
disabilities who require extra-reasonable accommodations are not
protected by the Act.212 Under this rule, however, an individual
could agree to pay for the cost of accommodations in excess of the
amount it is reasonable for the employer to bear. If the individual
with a disability can perform the essential functions of the job with
the extra accommodations, the rule would permit an individual to
bring herself back within the protection of the ADA. The individual
could perform the essential functions of the job (with both the
employer's accommodation and the extra accommodation provided
by the individual herself) and the employer would be subject only
to a reasonable accommodation. The employer would violate the Act
if it did not make the reasonable accommodation.213
The rule would also encourage individuals with disabilities to
seek the full set of accommodations to which they are entitled.
Assume, for example, an individual with a disability who is
presented with two jobs, one quite desirable, but requiring an
expensive accommodation, and another less desirable, but requiring
an inexpensive and clearly reasonable accommodation. The
argument above was that the individual may shy away from the
first job because of the risk she would end up with nothing if
the accommodation is determined to be extra-reasonable. The
211. The form of the payment should not matter. Thus, the individual with a disability
should be able to pay by making a direct payment to the employer (or the entity providing
the accommodation) or by accepting lower wages or benefits.
212. See supra note 177-79 and accompanying text.
213. Note that, although the employer is never subject to more than the costs of a
reasonable accommodation, the rule would require employers to expend more on
accommodations. Without the rule, the employer would have no ADA obligation to
individuals who require extra-reasonable accommodations. With the rule, the employer
would have an ADA obligation which is equal to the maximum accommodation which is
reasonable in the circumstances.
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individual may opt instead for the less desirable job with lower risk.
The option of paying for the portion of the accommodation costs
above the reasonable level would allow the individual to pursue the
desirable job at lower risk. She could agree to pay the potentially
extra-reasonable portion of the accommodation costs and thus
ensure access to the better job. At a cost that the individual with a
disability determines to be reasonable (otherwise she would not pay
it and opt instead for the less desirable job),2"' the rule permits her
to apply for a more desirable job that maximizes the reasonable
accommodation the employer must make.2 x5
The proposed rule would be unobjectionable, albeit less beneficial,
in a world with perfect information. Assume that the precise cost of
accommodation and the precise dividing line between reasonable
and extra-reasonable accommodations are known. Under current
law, an individual with a disability who requires an accommodation
on the extra-reasonable side of the dividing line is unprotected by
the ADA. Under the proposed view, that individual would have the
214. An individual with a disability will only be willing to pay for extra-reasonable
accommodations if the expected benefits from the better job justify her investment in extra-
reasonable accommodation costs. Assume, for example, that the less desirable and more
desirable jobs pay $100 and $200, respectively. Assume also that the individual with a
disability estimates that, without any contribution by her, there is only a .2 probability that
the accommodations she needs will be determined to be reasonable. Under the old view, she
is unlikely to seek the better job because the less desirable job pays $100, whereas the
expected benefits of the better job are only $40 (.2 * $200). Now consider three scenarios.
First, assume that a contribution of extra-reasonable costs of $80 increases the probability
of getting the more desirable job to 1.0. Now the expected benefits of the more desirable job
are $200 (1.0 * $200), whereas the accommodation costs are $80, producing a net expected
benefit of $120. Because this exceeds the benefit of the less desirable job, the individual with
a disability will agree to pay the extra-reasonable accommodation costs. Second, assume that
the extra-reasonable costs required to enable the individual to perform the job are $120,
rather than $80. Now the net expected benefit of the more desirable job is only $80 ($200
minus $120), which is less than the expected benefits of the "less desirable" job. The
individual would be unwilling to pay the extra-reasonable accommodation costs. Third,
assume that the extra-reasonable accommodation costs are $80, but that they only increase
the probability of getting the more desirable job to .6. Now the expected benefits of the more
desirable job are 120 (0.6 * $200) and the accommodation costs are $80, producing a net
expected benefit of $40. Once again, this is less than the expected benefits of the other job,
so the individual would be unwilling to pay the extra costs.
215. In this circumstance, once again, the employer must pay more in accommodation
costs under the proposed rule. Without the rule, the employer pays only the low
accommodation cost associated with the less desirable job. With the rule, the employer must




option of paying for the cost of the extra-reasonable accom-
modations,21 the employer would be required to pay the reasonable
costs, and the individual would be entitled to ADA protection. The
only effect of the proposed rule would be that it better fulfills the
ADA's goal of providing full and fair opportunities to individuals
with disabilities. More of them would be able to take advantage of
the Act's requirement that employers pay the cost of reasonable
accommodations.
The proposed rule would be less beneficial in a world with perfect
information because its other function-encouraging individuals to
seek full accommodations-would be unnecessary. In the real
world, individuals with disabilities often do not seek the full
accommodations because they are uncertain about the reach of the
accommodation duty. That, however, would not be a problem in a
perfect information world; individuals with disabilities would know
the precise extent of the employer's responsibility, as would the
employer. The risk of losing would not inhibit the individual's
enforcement of her rights, because there would be no risk. On the
other hand, the individual would never have to sue to enforce her
rights because, by assumption, the employer would also know the
extent of its obligations. The proposed rule would be less beneficial
216. Analysis ofthe willingness ofindividuals with disabilities to pay for extra-reasonable
accommodation costs is simplified in a world with perfect information because the
probabilistic element is removed. See supra note 207. Individuals with disabilities would still
only agree to pay for extra-reasonable accommodations to the extent their cost was less than
the extra benefits of the job sought over the next best job in the economy, but they would
know precisely the value of both jobs, the cost of accommodation, and the maximum amount
of the employer's reasonable accommodation obligation. For example, assume that an
individual with a disability could obtain a job paying $100, but is interested in a better job
paying $120 for which she needs an accommodation. Assume also that the reasonable level
of accommodation is $10. Under the old view, an individual with a disability who needed an
accommodation of $11 or more would be unprotected by the Act; she would have to fall back
on the job paying $100. Under the new view, an individual with a disability requiring an
accommodation up to $30 would have access to the better job. An individual requiring an
accommodation of $30 would be willing to pay $20 for extra-reasonable accommodations. The
employer would then be required to pay the reasonable share of $10. The individual paying
$20 for extra-reasonable accommodations would end up with a net income exactly equal to
that of the lower-paying job; that is, her income would be $120 minus the $20 she paid
herself for the extra-reasonable accommodations. The individual would be willing to pay
amounts less than $20 for extra-reasonable accommodations because then she would come
out ahead compared to the lower-paying job, but she would be unwilling to pay anything
more than $20.
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if information were perfect, but only because the assumption
removes one of the problems addressed by the rule.
In the real world, one fear about the proposed rule is that, given
the opening, employers may attempt to shift some of the costs of
reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities. In the
real world, the precise boundary between reasonable and extra-
reasonable accommodation costs is not clear. Employers may
attempt to exploit this uncertainty and require individuals with
disabilities to pay more than only extra-reasonable costs. One
response to this concern is that employers who do this are violating
the ADA. Under both the current view of the Act and the proposed
rule, employers must provide all reasonable accommodations and
must ignore their cost in considering individuals with disabilities.
An employer who attempts to shift its responsibilities to individuals
with disabilities risks violating the Act.
Despite this legal prohibition, it is nevertheless possible that
some employers may use the new rule to shift some reasonable
costs to individuals with disabilities. If that occurs, that adverse
outcome must be weighed against the possible positive outcomes of
the proposed rule. As indicated, the likely benefits of the proposed
rule will flow to individuals who are currently not protected by the
Act because they require extra-reasonable accommodations and to
individuals who are more likely to seek (and obtain) fuller
accommodations than they would without the rule. These benefits
are likely to be substantial and, of equal importance, they are
directed at a needy subset of individuals with disabilities, those
that require extra-reasonable accommodations and those that
require (and deserve) more accommodations than they are currently
receiving.21 In all probability, these benefits would exceed the costs
of employers illegally shifting some of the reasonable portion of the
accommodation burden.
This proposal for expanding the reach of the duty of reasonable
accommodation is analogous to liberal proposals to ease the equal
pay requirement under the sex discrimination laws.21 As there, the
217. Once again, the studies showing that the accommodations currently being provided
by employers are inexpensive supports the claim that individuals with disabilities are not
seeking the full extent of the accommodations required by the Act. See supra note 207 and
accompanying text.
218. See McCaffery, supra note 25, at 655-56; see also Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative
1282 [Vol. 44:1197
WORKPLACE DISABILITIES
proposal here would expand opportunities by making it less possible
for firms to refuse to hire individuals with disabilities because of
the greater cost of employing them. Employers remain subject to all
of the other requirements of the Act: They must engage in an
interactive process, pay all the costs of reasonable accommodation,
ignore those costs in making employment decisions, and so on. The
new rule would simply remove another significant barrier to full
workplace participation by individuals with disabilities: If they
require extra-reasonable accommodations and they are willing to
pay for those extra costs, the employer could no longer refuse to hire
them because of the extra costs.
CONCLUSION
Although the ADA borrowed heavily from Title VII, our central
claim is that the ADA's requirements extend considerably beyond
those of the earlier statute. Under current Title VII law, the
employer defines the job as it wishes; Title VII merely insists that
workers and applicants for those jobs be treated without regard to
race or sex. The ADA goes beyond Title VII by requiring employers
to restructure the jobs themselves.
For example, consider again the stylized example we presented
earlier of the job lifting 80-pound sacks. As long as the job is
structured to require the lifting, Title VII currently does little to
protect against the disparate impact that the lifting requirement
has against women. Title VII questions only the test and its relation
to the job as defined by the employer. Title VII does not question the
employer's job description itself. This is not an isolated problem.
Many jobs in the economy are not structured in women-friendly
ways but, once again, that is not a problem addressed by Title VII.
Title VII does not obligate employers to restructure jobs to allow
women to breastfeed their babies. It does not require scheduling to
make it easier for parents to attend their children's school
activities. It does little, and may inhibit, efforts to accommodate
pregnancy. It does not require breaking up those 80-pound sacks
into 20- or 40-pound sacks.
Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 159 n.65 (1994).
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The ADA, in sharp contrast, does demand that employers
restructure jobs to accommodate individuals with disabilities, and
asks courts to scrutinize the process of restructuring. Once the
ADA's demand becomes more familiar, we suspect it will filter back
into Title VII, and perhaps it should. After all, if employers must
accommodate individuals with disabilities, why not women?
The possibility of this type of feedback heightens the need for
careful thought about the scope and limits of reasonable accom-
modation. Reasonable accommodation is important at the moment
because it affects the lives and opportunities of individuals with
disabilities, but we predict the concept will have much broader
application in the future. Before long, reasonable accommodation
will escape the boundaries of disability law and shift our under-
standing of the entire constellation of discrimination law.
